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WHEN THE SUPREME COURT SHUTS
ITS DOORS, MAY CONGRESS RE-OPEN
THEM?: SEPARATION OF POWERS
CHALLENGES TO § 27A OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
When the 1980s drew to a close, Americans awoke to a number of
insider trading scandals.' Stories of billions of dollars squandered and
life savings lost riveted the nation's attention. 2 Individuals with names
like Milken and Boesky stood before the nation as the embodiment of
greed.'
In the midst of this frenzy, the United States Supreme Court
decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis Petigrow v. Gilbertson and
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.'' Together, these decisions estab-
lished a new statute of limitations for private actions brought under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("§ 10(b)") 5 and Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission ("Rule 10b-5"), 6 and
I Nancy Rivera Brooks, 1990-1991; Winners & Losers, L.A. TtmEs, Jan. 2, 1991, at D2.
2 See id.
lixmvs B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 516 (1992).
4 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111  S. Ct. 2773, 2782, reh'g denied,
112 S. Ct. 27 (1991); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v, Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2448 (1991).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of the investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). Rule 10(b)-5 provides:
It shall be unlawfid for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
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applied the new limitations period retroactively to all parties with such
litigation currently pending.' As a result, lower courts dismissed as
time-barred a multitude of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private actions
legitimately brought under prevailing jurisdictional statutes of limita-
tions.'
Because suits against high profile financial figures of the 1980s
like Milken and Boesky were among those dismissed, a public outcry
over the Lampf and Beam decisions arose.' Congress responded by
passing § 27A of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("§ 27A"). 1 °
Under § 27A, the statute of limitations applicable in a jurisdiction on
June 19, 1991, the day before Lampf and Beam were decided, is con-
trolling for all cases in that jurisdiction affected by the retroactive
application of Lampf." The statute also provides that upon proper
motion, any claim dismissed as time-barred under Lampf can be rein-
stated within sixty days of § 27A's enactment.' 2
 Section 27A has sparked
a significant separation of powers debate both among commentators
and the federal courts of the United States.' 3
7
 Lampf 111 S. CC at 2782; Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448.
8 E.g., Boudreau v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 942 17.2d 497, 498 (8th Cir. 1991); Anixter v.
Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2(1 1420, 1442 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. granted and judgment vacated
sub nom. Dennler v. Trippett., 112 S. Ct. 1658 amended 122 S. Ct., 1757 (1992) [hereinafter Anixter
I]; Cohen v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 276, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Continental Bank,
Nat'l Ass'n v. Village of Ludlow, 777 F. Supp. 92, 103 (D. Mass. 1991).
9
 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAW § 1.06, at 1-20 (1992);
Kathryn A. Oberly & Stephen M. Shapiro, The Year in Review: Significant Judicial Developments,
in 24TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 9, 46 (1992).
1()
 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (commonly known as § 27A of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934). Section 27A provides:
(a) Effect on pending causes of action
The limitations period for any private civil action implied under [section 10(b)]
of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation
period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of
retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
Any private civil action implied under [section 10(b)] of this title that was
commenced on or before June 19, 1991—
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period provided
by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as
such laws existed on June 19, 1991,
shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after [the date
of enactment of this section].
Id.
" See id.
12
 See id.
13 To date, four circuit courts and a number of district courts have held the statute to be
constitutional. E.g., Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., No. 91-16907, 92-15986, 92-15901, 92-16193,
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In striking down the statute, the courts have articulated three
separation of powers grounds." First, courts have determined that
§ 27A directs them to ignore the Lampf statute of limitations without
creating a new limitations period.'' Second, courts have held that the
statute impermissibly reverses final judicial judgments.L 6 Finally, courts
have contended that the statute directs the courts to ignore a consti-
tutionally based decision of the United States Supreme Court. 17 Al-
though these arguments have been successful in a number of districts,
most courts have reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the
statute is constitutional.L 8
This Note argues that, although Congress did direct federal courts
to ignore the Lampf decision in a specific set of cases without providing
a new statute of limitations, Congress did not violate the separation of
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6995, at *29 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1993); Fleming v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, No.
91-3318, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6074, at *23-24 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 1993); Henderson v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1575 (1 Rh Cir. 1992); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d
1533, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Dennler v. Trippet, 61 U,S.L.W. 3714 (1993)
[hereinafter Anixter II); In re Integrated Resources Real Estate Ltd. Partnership Sec. Litig.,
[current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 97,311, at 95,541 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1993); Agoilio V. Manaker,
[current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 97,265, at 95,198 (N.D.N.Y Nov. 13, 1992); Dendinger v.
First Nat'l Corp., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 97,268, at 95,224 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 1992);
Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Stipp. 470, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Nevertheless,
a significant number of courts have held that the statute is unconstitutional. E.g., Pacific Mut.
Life Iris, Co. v. First Republickbank Corp., 806 F. Supp. 108, 115 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Treiber v. Katz,
796 E Supp. 1054, 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Stipp. 1098, 1100 (D.
Colo. 1992); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 K Supp. 1092, 1098 (D. Colo.
1992); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 235 (E.D. Ky. 1992); In re Brichard Sec.
Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1992). See also IltsitomENTitm„ supra note 9, § 1,06, at
1-32 to 1-40; Oberly & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 46-55; Anthony Michael Sabino, A Statutory
Beacon or a Relighted Lampf? The Constitutional Crisis of the New Limitary Period far federal
Securities Law Actions, 28 TULSA LJ. 23, 65 (1992); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Consti-
tutionality of § 27A: Statute of Limitations, N.Y. 14., May 21, 1992, at 5; Barbara Franklin, Last
Word on 'Lamp'', N.Y. 14, Oct. 22, 1992, at 5; Richard L. Jacobson, Turning Down the Limpf: Is
Exchange Act Section 27A Constitutional?, 6 INSIGHTS, April 1992, at 36; Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A.
Groskaufmanis, Was the Lunpf Quick Fix Constitutional?, NAT'L Li., Dec. 7, 1992, at 16; Thomas
L. Riesenberg, The SECs Amicus Briefs on Lampf, 6 Inrsiourrs, May 1992, at 37,
14 See Oberly & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 47-49; Block & Hoff, , supra note 13, at 10. Section
27A has also been challenged as a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses. See Block & Hoff, supra note 13, at 10. Because neither of these claims has
ever been truly successful, this Note does not discuss them in any depth. For a brief outline of
the arguments set forth by the parties as well as a proposed response, see Sabino, supra note 13,
at 50-52, 54-56.
15 E.g., Bank of Denver, 789 F. Sapp. at 1097; Brichard, 788 F. Stipp. at 1105.
E.g., Treiber, 790 F. Supp. at 1002; Plant, 789 F. Stipp. at 235; Brichard, 788 F. Stipp. at 1107.
17 E.g., Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1111-12; TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Stipp, 587, 594 (E.D.
La. 1992).
18 E.g., Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1575; Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1547; Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp.
at 483.
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powers doctrine because it did not direct the outcome of those cases.
This Note also determines that Congress did not direct the courts to
ignore a constitutionally based decision of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, this Note concludes that the portion of the congressional
statute that requires the courts to reinstate cases dismissed as a result
of Lampf improperly intrudes on the realm of the judiciary and thus
violates the separation of powers doctrine. Section I examines the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Lampf and Beam and the
enactment of § 27A, the statute Congress passed in an effort to rein-
state cases dismissed as a result of Lampf and Beam) Section 11 explains
the separation of powers doctrine and discusses the holdings of the
federal courts that have addressed constitutional challenges to the
statute. 2° Finally, section III considers the likely future for this contro-
versy and analyzes the arguments challenging the statute, determining
that because Congress may not alter final judgments of the courts, the
reinstatement provision of § 27A must be held unconstitutional. 2 '
I. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF A
NEW STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. The Supreme Court's Creation and Retroactive Application
In 1991, in Lampf, Plena, Lipkind, Prupis Cq' Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
the United States Supreme Court delineated a federal statute of limi-
tations for private actions instituted pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. 22
 In a 54 decision, the Court held that private § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 actions must be brought within one year of discovery of the
violation and within three years of the violation's occurrence ("one-
and-three year period"). 23 The Lampf Court reasoned that when a
subsection of a federal statute lacks a limitations period and the main
statute provides an analogous express statute of limitations, a court
should use the express limitary period rather than applying the general
practice of borrowing an analogous state limitations period. 21 Relying
on express causes of action created by the 1934 Securities and Ex-
change Act, each with a variation of a one-and-three-year limitations
period, the Court adopted the statutory configuration as the new
19 See infra notes 23-112 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 113-347 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 348-86 and accompanying text.
22 1 1 S. Ct. 2773,2782, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 27 (1991).
"Id. at 2782.
24 Id. at 2780.
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federal limitations period. 25 Because the plaintiffs' did not bring suit
within this limitations period, the Court dismissed their claim as un :
timely. 26
The plaintiffs sued the defendant, a law firm, because, based on
letters of opinion prepared by the defendant, the plaintiffs bought
shares in several limited partnerships, expecting tax benefits. 27 The
partnerships subsequently failed and the Internal Revenue Service
disallowed the tax benefits determining that the partnership benefits
were overvalued, 23 The plaintiffs filed suit charging the defendant with
violation of, among other things, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 29 Plaintiffs
claimed that misrepresentations in the defendant's memoranda led
them to invest in the partnerships."
Upon the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon determined that the
plaintiffs' securities claims were governed by the state statute of limi-
tations for the most analogous forum-state cause of action." The court
determined that the Oregon fraud statute would apply, with a two-year
statute of limitations. 32 Based on the facts of the case, the district court
determined that the plaintiffs had failed to bring suit within two years
of being placed on inquiry notice of the defendant's alleged violation."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case, determining that the district court
had not completely resolved factual issues controlling when plaintiffs
had or should have discovered the violations.54 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuits
as to whether a uniform federal limitations period applied to § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 claims or whether analogous, but diverse, state statutes
of limitations should be applied."
23 Id. at 2780-81.
26 1d. at 2782.
27 Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2776.
23 Id.
29 Id.
39 1d.
31 Id. at 2777.
32 Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2777.
33 1d.
34 Id.
55 Id. See, e.g., Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 364 (2d Cir. 1990); Short v.
Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Date Access Sys. Sec. Litig.,
843 F.2d 1537, 1550 (3d Cir.) (en Banc), cert. denied sub nom. Vitiello v. Kahlowsky & Co., 488
U.S. 849 (1988); Corwin v. Marney, Orton Inv., 843 F,2d 194, 197 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S.
924 (1988). See also Howard S. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 Claims: A
Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. Cot.o. L. Rev. 235, 237 (1989).
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The Supreme Court's discussion of the issue began with a plurality
opinion.s6
 The plurality noted the general rule that when no statute of
limitations is provided by Congress for a federal cause of action, the
presiding court "borrows" or "absorbs" the local time limitation most
analogous to the pending issues' The plurality noted, however, that
the Supreme Court had created a uniform statute where operation of
a state limitations period frustrated the purpose of the federal statute. 38
The plurality continued by stating that the borrowing practice is to be
abandoned only when a federal rule provides a closer analogy than
state statutes and when the federal policies at stake make the federal
rule a "more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." 39
Then, with a majority, the Court turned its attention to § 10(b). 90
The Lampf Court noted that its task in assigning a uniform statute of
limitations was complicated by the fact that the text of § 10(b) does
not provide for a private remedy based on violation of its require-
ments.'" Rather, the private cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 was judicially created and implied under the statute for the past
forty-seven years." The Lampf Court thus set out on what it referred
to as the "awkward task" of establishing the statute of limitations that
Congress wanted the courts to apply for a cause of action Congress
never knew existed."
The Lampf Court continued by determining that when the claim
asserted derives from a statute that also contains an express cause of
action and statute of limitations, a court should look first to that statute
sa Lampf, 111 S. Ct at 2778.
57 Id. This practice was derived from the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). Id.
"Id. (citing DelCostello v. International Slid. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 (1983)). Some
commentators and judges had already asserted that § 10(b) was just such a situation. In the words
of one judge, the practice of borrowing analogous state limitation periods in § 10(b) actions was
"one tottering parapet of a ramshackle edifice." Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987). One commentator argued that the lack of a standardized federal
statute of limitations encouraged forum shopping and wasted judicial resources as judges were
forced to spend time searching for an analogous local statute. Bloomentlial, supra note 35, at
296.
Lampf, 111 S. Ct at 2778 (quoting Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324
(1989)).
4" Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2779.
41 1d.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b), supra note 5. The Lampf Court readily acknowledged that
Congress never intended for a private remedy to exist. 111 S. Ct. at 2780. Rule 106-5 also does
not expressly provide for a private remedy. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, supra note 6; THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.2, at 449 (1985).
42 Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2779. The first case to imply the private cause of action from the statute
was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). ("disregard of the
command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort").
45 Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780.
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to determine the appropriate limitations period.'" Thus, only where no
federal analogy is available should a court apply state borrowing prin-
ciples.45 Applying this rule to § 10(b), the Lampf Court noted that the
1934 Securities and Exchange Act contained a number of express
causes of action and, with one exception, each was a variation of the
one-and-three-year period proposed. 46 Thus, the Court adopted the
one-and-three-year statute of limitations period for private actions
brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 47
The Lampf Court concluded its opinion by retroactively applying
the new limitations period to the parties before it. 45 Thus, the Court
dismissed the plaintiffs' suit as time-barred. 49
 The Court offered no
explanation for this unprecedented holding."
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented to the
Court's opinion.'' Justice O'Connor questioned the Lampf Court's
decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit based on a federal statute of
limitations announced four-and-one-half years after the suit was filed. 52
Justice O'Connor noted that previously, the Court had never applied
a new limitations period retroactively to the case in which it was an-
nounced in order to bar an action that had been timely filed under
the prevailing law in the circuit. 53 Justice O'Connor argued that the
44 Id.
45 Id,
46 Id. See &son U.S.C. §§ 781(e) (willful manipulation of security prices), 78r(c) (misleading
filings), 77in (1988). Several circuit courts, seeking to create a federal standard, had already
looked to the statute as enacted by Congress in 1934 and arrived at the one-and-three-year statute
of limitations. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 364 (2d Cir, 1990); Short v, Belleville
Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Data Access Sys, Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d
1537, 1550 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert, denied sub nom. Vidello v. Kahlowsky & Co., 488 U.S. 849
(1988). Nevertheless, some circuits continued to rely on analogous state statutes of limitations.
E.g., Corwin v. Marney, Orton Inv., 843 F.2d 194, 197 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
47 Lamp/ l ill S. Ct. at 2781, The SEC argued that § 20A of the Insider Trading and Securities
Enforcement Act of 1988, with a five-year statute of limitations, provided the closest federal
analogy to § 1013. Id. The Lampf Court chose not to adopt this argument. Id.
"Id. at 2782.
1d .
" See ill.
51 Id. at. 2785 (O'Connor, J„ dissenting).
52 Lamp': 111 S. Ct. at 2786.
" Id. See Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1987) (upholding Third
Circuit decision not to apply new statute of limitations retroactively); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97, 109 (1971). In Chevron Git, the United States Supreme Court declined to retroactively
apply a new statute of limitations to the parties in the case and instead developed a three-prong
test for determining when a court should decline to apply a new rule of law retroactively. Id. at
406-07. Initially, the test provides that the decision to be applied must set forth a new principle
of law. Id. at 406. Second, the court must consider whether retroactive application of the law will
advance or retard its operation. Id. at 406-07. Finally, a decision should nut he applied retroac-
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Court's past practice reflected the principle that due process is violated
when a party is arbitrarily denied the right to be heard in court!' She
concluded by asserting that the Court ignored this traditional standard
of justifiable reliance and due process, thereby "visiting unprecedented
unfairness" on plaintiffs."
In sum, the Lampf Court created a new federal statute of limita-
tions for private actions brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 56 The
Court determined that because the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 provided an analogous express statute of limitations, the one-and-
three year limitations period for § 10(b) served as the best expression
of congressional intent." Thus, the Court held that in § 10(b) actions
federal courts should no longer borrow statute of limitations from
analogous state statutes but should uniformly apply the federal one-
and-three year period." Because the plaintiffs' suit had not been
brought within this limitations period, the Court dismissed it. 59
On the same day as the United States Supreme Court issued the
Lampf opinion, it decided James B. Beam Distilling Co. V. Georgia.w The
Beam Court held that when the Supreme Court applies a rule of law
to the litigants in one case, it must apply that rule to all other similarly
situated litigants. 6 ' The Court reasoned that "selective prospectivity,"
whereby a new law is applied to the parties before the court but not
to other similarly situated litigants, violates principles of equity and
stare decisis. 92 Accordingly, the Court retroactively applied an earlier
ruling to the parties in Beam, despite the fact that the Beam claim arose
before the Court decided the earlier case. 63
Beam involved a Georgia state law that imposed an excise tax on
imported alcohol that was twice the tax imposed on alcohol from
Georgia-grown products." In an earlier decision, the United States
Supreme Court held as unconstitutional a law exempting certain lo-
tively if it is likely to produce inequitable results. Id. at 407, The Lampf majority failed to address
the applicability of the Chevron analysis. 111 S. Ct at 2787 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
54 Lampf, II 1 S. CL at 2786.
55 Id. at 2787-88.
56 Id. at 2782.
57 1d. at 2780.
58 id.
59 Lamp'', 111 S. Ct. at 2782.
60 111 S. Ct. '2439, 2448 (1991).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 2446.
68 Id. at 2441. In the earlier case, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the Court determined that
a 20% Hawaiian liquor excise law, which exempted certain locally produced liquors, violated the
Commerce Clause. 468 U.S. 263, 265, 276 (1984).
64 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, I I 1 S. Ct. 2439, 2442 (1991).
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tally produced alcohol from a liquor excise tax. 65 In Beam, the Georgia
Supreme Court determined that the tax violated the Federal Constitu-
tion under the Supreme Court's earlier ruling, but the courts held that
the Supreme Court's ruling in the earlier case was to be applied
prospectively only.'''' The Georgia Supreme Court therefore denied the
plaintiff a refund of the higher taxes imposed under the statute. 67 A
plurality of the Supreme Court held, however, that similarly situated
litigants should be treated alike, and accordingly held that the earlier
decision applied to the parties in Beam, despite the fact that Beam arose
before the Court decided the earlier case."
The Court began its plurality opinion by noting that only when
the law changes do principles of retroactivity become an issue for
courts.° According to the plurality, when the law changes, choice of
law considerations dictate whether that rule should be applied retro-
actively or prospectively. 70
 The Court observed that there are three ways
in which this choice of law problem may be solved. 7 ' First, decisions
may be applied fully retroactively, both to the parties before the court
as well as to all others with claims pending. 72 The Beam Court noted
that full retroactivity is regarded as the norm and is consistent with the
declaratory theory of law, that propounds that courts only find the
law—they do not make it. 7"
65 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265, 276.
66
 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 382 S.E.2d 95, 96 (Ga. 1989). In making this
determination, the Georgia Supreme Court applied the retroactivity test set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil. 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971); see supra note 53. The Georgia
Supreme Court determined that the first prong of the Chevron Oil test applied because, during
the time the tax was collected, the state believed the tax was constitutional. Beam, 382 S.E.2d at
96. Moreover, the court noted that when the Georgia legislature learned of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Bacchus, it modified the tax law to correct its defects. Id. Next, the court noted that the
second prong of the test was inapplicable because the tax statute was repealed in 1985. Id. Finally,
in applying the third prong, the Georgia court conducted a balancing test. Id. On the one hand,
the increased tax level was likely to have been passed on to the distilling company's customers.
Id. at 97. On the other hand, requiring the state to return approximately $30 million in taxes
which the state had collected in good faith under a presumptively valid statute would impose a
severe financial burden on the state and its citizens. Id. Accordingly, the court applied an
exception to the general rule that unconstitutional statutes arc void ab initio, on the grounds that
application of the rule would be unjust. Id.
67 Beam, 382 S.E.2d at 96.
69 Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2446. Although a majority of the Court joined the decision, four Justices
wrote separate opinions. Id. at 2441. No single opinion garnered the support of more than three
Justices. Id.
69 Id. at 2443.
7° Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
75 Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2443.
862	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:853
Second, decisions may be applied purely prospectively." In other
words, the court may apply the newly announced rule neither to the
parties before it nor to those who are similarly situated." The Beam
Court noted that the Supreme Court has infrequently limited cases to
pure prospective application.'"
Finally, the decision may be applied through "selective prospectiv-
ity."77 Specifically, the rule is applied in the case through which it is
announced, but courts continue to apply the old rule to all cases with
facts predating the pronouncement." In analyzing this alternative, the
Court determined that selective prospectivity violates the tenet that
similarly situated litigants should be treated similarly." Noting that the
Court had already proscribed selective prospectivity in the criminal
context, the Court concluded that selective prospectivity is also imper-
missible in the civil contexts° Thus, the Beam Court held that once a
court has applied a new rule retroactively to the parties before it, that
rule must be consistently applied to all other litigants. 8 ' The Court went
on to exclude, however, litigants barred by procedural requirements
or res judicata, stating that "once suit is barred by res judicata or by
statutes of limitation or repose, a new rule cannot reopen the door
already closed."82 In delivering this holding, the Court reiterated that
the opinion rested on narrow choice of law grounds."
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun,
concurred in the Court's holding that selective prospectivity is imper-
missible!" He argued, however, that the basis for this decision is not
ri
75 Id,
76 1d. (citing, inter alia, Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,106-07 (1971)).
77 1d. at 2444.
78 Id. This method was initially applied when a number of prophylactic criminal procedure
laws were handed down to assure criminal defendants' rights. Id. The Court declined to apply
these judgments retroactively in fear of upsetting the criminal justice process. Id.
79 Beam, Ill S. CL at 2444.
8° Id. at 2444-45,2446 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,328 (1987)). In Griffith, the
Court held that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecution should be retroactively applied
to all cases, state or federal, in which final judgments had not been reached. 479 U.S. at 328. The
Gnffith Court determined that failure to retroactively apply newly declared constitutional rules
to pending criminal cases violated norms of constitutional adjudication. Id. at 322. The Court
reasoned that Article III commanded the Court to adjudicate only cases and controversies and
thus, unlike a legislature, the Court was unable to pronounce constitutional rules of criminal
procedure on a broad basis. Id. As a second rationale, the Court noted that selective prospectivity
violates the principal that similarly situated litigants should be treated alike. Id. at 323.
81 Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2447-48.
52 Id. at 2446.
83 Id. at 2448. Justice White concurred in the judgment on the narrow grounds set forth by
the majority opinion. Id. at 2449 (White, J., concurring). Justice White disagreed, however, with
the Court's failure to endorse the propriety of pure prospective application. Id.
84 Id. at 2450 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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inequity, as the opinion of the Court set forth." Rather, Justice Scalia
maintained that selective prospectivity is prohibited by the Constitu-
tion and thus cannot be characterized as a choice of law question."
Justice Scalia noted that Article III of the Constitution of the United
States vests the judicial power in the Court to say what the law is, not
to make it." Accordingly, Justice Scalia concluded that selective pro-
spectivity was not merely inequitable, but constitutionally proscribed
because it represented an effort by the courts to make law in violation
of the separation of powers doctrine.""
Justice Blackmun also concurred, joined by Justice Marshall and
Justice Scalia. 89 Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Scalia that the
Constitution prohibits selective prospectivity." He maintained that this
principle was clearly laid out when the Court disallowed selective
prospectivity in the criminal context.`'' Justice Blackmun continued
that, unlike a legislature, the Court is incapable of promulgating rules
with only a prospective application. 92 He concluded, therefore, that the
ban on selective prospectivity "derives from the integrity of judicial
review," which does not justify applying a rule which the court has
found to be wrong to litigants who are in or still may come to court."
The Beam plurality therefore extended the prohibition against
selective prospectivity to civil cases." The Court reasoned that selective
prospectivity violates principles of equity and stare decisis.°5 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that when the Supreme Court applies a rule of
law to litigants in one case, that rule must be applied to all similarly
situated litigants."
One week after the pronouncement of the Lampf and Beam deci-
sions, the United States Supreme Court made clear the combined
effect of the two cases when read together.° On June 28, 1991, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to and remanded for further con-
85 Id.
MI id,
87 Beam, Ill S. Ct. al '2450-51 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803) (holding that Congress may not enact a law that contravenes the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution)).
68 /d. at 2450 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89 1d, at 2449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
9° Id.
9 r Id,
92 Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2449.
93 Id, at 2450.
94 Id. 91 '2446.
95 ird .
96 1d. at '2448.
97 Robert W Ginn, United States Supreme Court Changes in Determining Whether Judicial
Decisions Should Apply Retroactively, 25 CRKicwroN L. REV. 29, 38 (1991).
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sideration the case of Northwest Savings Bank v. Welch, a § 10(b) statute
of limitations case on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit." The Supreme Court instructed the Second
Circuit to consider Welch in light of the Court's decisions in Beam and
Lampf.99
 Thus, the Supreme Court was instructing lower courts that
Lampf must be applied retroactively to all private § 10(b) cases pend-
ing on June 20, 1991, the date the Court issued the Lampf decision.'"
As a result of Lampf, Beam and Northwest Savings, federal courts
throughout the country dismissed private actions brought under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as time-barred.'° 1 As of November 21, 1991,
according to United States Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.),
$650 million in securities fraud claims were dismissed and over $4
billion in fraud claims, including suits against Michael Milken, Charles
Keating and Fred Carr were subject to dismissal.'° 2 A public outcry
arose.'" Congress, therefore, felt compelled to act in order to try and
restore some of the damage caused by the Lampf and Beam decisions.m
S. Congress's Response
—Section 27A of the Exchange Act
After the effect of the Supreme Court's decisions became clear,
Congress sought to enact an express statute of limitations for private
causes of action brought under § 10(b) and Rule 1013-5. 1 °' In both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, bills were introduced that
would create longer statutes of limitations than those established by
Lampf.'" Due to strong opposition, however, the proponents of the
98 II l S. Ct. 2882 (1991). The issue to be decided in the Second Circuit case, Welch v. Cadre
Capita4 was whether Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs. applied retroactively. Welch, 923 F.2d 989, 990
(2d Cir. 1991). In Ceres Partners, the Second Circuit abandoned the practice of borrowing
analogous state statutes of limitations in actions brought under § 10(b) in favor of a uniform
federal limitations period, such as the one created by the Lampf Court, applied retroactively. 918
F.2d 349, 364 (2d Cir. 1990). The Welch court applied the three-prong Chevron Oil test and,
determining that the test was satisfied, declined to apply the new statute of limitations retroac-
tively. 923 F.2d at 994-115.
99 Northwest Savings Bank, 111 S. Ct. at 2882-83.
1 °° See Ginn, supra note 97, at 38.
1 ° 1 E.g., Boudreau v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 942 F.2d 497, 498 (8th Cir. 1991); Anixter 1,
939 F.2d 1420, 1442 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Dennler v.
Trippett, 112 S. Ct. 1658 amended 122 S. Ct. 1757 (1992); Cohen v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc.,
777 F. Stipp. 276, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1991): Continental Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Village of Ludlow, 777 F.
Supp. 92, 103 (D. Mass. 1991). In Anixter I, for example, the plaintiffs' $130 million jury award
on a fraud claim was dismissed on appeal as time-barred after 18 years of litigation. 939 F.2d at
1442.
105 See 137 CONG. REC. 1111,812 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey).
LOS See BLOOMENTIIA 1,, supra note 9, § 1.06 at 1-20; Oberly & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 46.
11)4 See Sabino, supra note 13, at 26.
1 °5 0berly & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 46.
lu° On July 23, 1991, Senator Bryan (D-Nev.) introduced S. 1533, entitled "Securities Investor
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bills were unable to garner enough support to enact the longer statute
of limitations.' 07
When the efforts to pass a bill altering the statute of limitations
created by the Lampf decision failed, the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce reached a compromise. 1 °8 The committee members
agreed to leave the statute of limitations intact but to "reverse its
retroactive effect" on cases that were timely filed prior to the Court's
decision. 1 °9 This compromise, codified as § 27A of the Exchange Act,
provides that the jurisdictional statute of limitations existing on June
19, 1991, the day before Lampf and Beam were decided, is the limita-
tions period for any private action implied under § 10(b) filed on or
before that date. 41° Moreover, subsection (b) of the statute provides for
the reinstatement of any private action implied under § 10(b) that was
timely filed on or before June 19, 1991, and was dismissed as a result
of the Supreme Court's retroactive application of the new statute of
limitations announced in Lampf.."' Thus, as a result of the passage of
§ 27A, there are now two statutes of limitations that apply to private
actions implied under § 10(b): the one-and-three year period for those
cases filed after June 19, 1991, and the applicable jurisdictional limita-
tions period for cases filed prior to that date." 2
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS CHALLENGES To § 27A
The enactment of § 27A set off a wave of litigation throughout the
country." 3 A number of courts have determined that the statute vio-
lates the separation of powers doctrine because it impermissibly en-
croaches on the realm of the judiciary."4 To date, the Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have upheld the constitutionality of
Protection Act." See 137 CONG. REC. S10,675-76, 510,691 (daily ed. July 23, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Riegle). The bill proposed that Congress enact a new statute of limitations requiring that
private § 10(b) actions be filed within two years of discovery or five years of the occurrence. Id.
at S10,691-92. On the House side, a similar bill was proposed by Representative Edward Markey
(D-Mass.). See 137 CONG. REC. H6,316 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991). Entitled The Securities Investors
Legal Rights Act of 1991," the bill proposed a 3-and-5-year statute of limitations. 137 CoNG.
E2,843 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (extended remarks of Rep. Markey).
107 137 CONG. Rix. S17,033-34 (statement of Sen. Domenici), See also B1.00MENTHAL, supra
note 9, § 1.06, at 1-20.
"BLOOMENTIIAI„ supra note 9, § 1.06, at 1-20.
109 See 137 CONG. Rix. HI 1,810-11 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
11 °15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(a) (1991). Sec supra note 10 for text of statute.
ln 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (b), See supra note 10 for text of statute.
112 0berly & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 54.
113 FnAnklin, supra note 13, at 5.
IHE.g, Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republickbank Corp., 806 F. Supp. 108, 115 (N.D,
Tex. 1992); Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Johnston v. Cigna Corp.,
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§ 27A.115 Appeals are also pending in the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Sixth Circuits.'"
A. The,Separation of Powers Doctrine
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is
stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of lib-
erty . . ." 7
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the concept of
maintaining three separate and distinct branches of government is
"essential to the preservation of liberty.""s The primary purpose of
separation of powers is to keep each branch of government inde-
pendent of one another, without risk of intimidation or control by
other branches.'" To this end, Article I imbues Congress with legisla-
tive powers, Article II installs the powers of the Executive in the Presi-
dent and Article III vests the judicial power of the United States in the
federal courts.'" The Framers did not intend, however, nor has the
Supreme Court determined, that separation of powers dictates that the
branches be hermetically sealed from one another.' 21 Rather, a degree
of interdependence among the branches is both expected and re-
quired.'" Thus, the Supreme Court has only struck down legislative or
executive action when a risk of the encroachment or aggrandizement
of one branch at the expense of another is present. 12"
An analysis of the constitutionality of § 27A requires discussion of
Congress's ability to pass retroactive case law as well as its capacity to
alter final judgments of the courts. Within the separated powers
789 F. Supp. 1098, 1100 (D. Colo. 1992); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 F.
Supp. 1092, 1098 (D, Colo. 1992); Plaut v, Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 235 (E.D.
Ky. 1992); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
115 Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., No. 91-16907, 92-15986, 92-15901, 92-16193, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6995, at *29 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1993); Berning v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, No. 91-3318,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6074, at *23-24 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 1993); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1992); Anixter 11, 977 F.2d 1533, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied sub fern. Dennler v. 'Tippet, 61 U.S.L.W. 3714 (1993).
116 Franklin, supra note 13, at 5. Statistics are as of September 30, 1992. Id.
117 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
118 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). In Mistretta, Congress upheld the
creation of the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent body within the judicial
branch authorized to promulgate criminal sentencing guidelines, against excessive delegation
and separation of powers challenges. Id. at 412.
119 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 760-61 (1982) (Burger, J. concurring).
120 U.S. CONST. art. I—III.
121 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381.
12'4 Id.
1 " Id, at 382. The Mistretta Court identified fear of encroachment as the determinative factor
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scheme, Congress has the authority to enact statutes embodying sub-
stantive law that the courts are required to enforce.'" These statutes
may retroactively affect rights and duties of litigants, as long as the
retroactive application of the statute is justified by a rational purpose.' 25
Congress's enactment must, however, alter either substantive or proce-
dural law.' 2" The legislature cannot simply contradict a Supreme Court
determination and prescribe a rule of decision in a case pending
before the courts without changing the underlying law.' 27
As a general rule, Congress also may not exercise an appellate-type
review of judicial judgments, either altering the judgment's terms or
ordering new trials in cases where final judgments have been issued.'"
Congressional reversal of final judgments violates the separation of
powers doctrine not only because it intrudes on the exclusive power
of the courts to adjudicate cases, but also because it allows litigants to
evade final rulings of the courts, effectively rendering a court's deci-
sion an advisory opinion.'" The Supreme Court has, however, made
in the Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence. Id. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986) (congressional retention of power to remove an officer charged with an
executive function violates separation of powers); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)
(one-house veto of Attorney General's execution of delegated powers violates separation of
powers); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (the
essential powers of Article III courts may not be vested in Article 1 courts). Thus, the Supreme
Court has upheld congressional and presidential actions when this danger is absent. Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 382. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988) (upholding judicial
designation of the Special Prosecutor); Commodity Futures Trading Cornett v. Schur, 478 U.S.
833, 857 (1986) (upholding agency's assumption of jurisdiction over slate law counter-claims as
presenting no risk of aggrandizement); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 933 U.S. 425,
444-45 (1977) (upholding legislation authorizing the General Services Administration to regulate
Executive Branch documents upon President's resignation).
124 5re LAURENCE EI. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-5, at 50 (2d ed. 1988).
115 United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 64 (1989) (statute requiring American claim-
ants to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to pay percentage of awards to United States does
not violate (Inc process).
126 Tunt•, supra note 124, § 3-5, at 50 (citing United States v. Klein, 8(} U.S. (13 Wall.) 128,
147 (1871)).
117 See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
128 Block & Hoff, supra note 13, at 10; see also Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 409, 413 11.4
(1792) ("no decision of any court of the United States can, under any circumstances ... agreeable
to the Constitution, be liable to a reversion, or even suspension, by the Legislature itself, in whom
no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested ...."); United States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22
Wall.) 641, 648 (1874) ("Congress cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme Court to the
re-examination and revision of any other tribunal or any other department or the government")
In addition to separation of powers violations, congressional intrusion in final judgments of the
judiciary also raises due process concerns. Block & Hoff, supra note 13, at 10. See McCullough v,
Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123 (1898) Milt. is not within the power of the legislature to take away
rights which have been once vested by jUdgrrlent")
119 Block & Hal „supra note 13, at 10. The prohibition against court advisory opinions was
first set forth by the Supreme Court in an August 8, 1793 letter to then-Secretary of Stai e Thomas
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exceptions to this rule.' 3° For example, in instances where Congress
orders relitigation of a matter previously determined in its favor, the
Supreme Court has determined that a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine has not occurred. 13 '
In 1871, in United States v. Klein, the United States Supreme Court
focused on Congress's capacity to pass retroactive laws and held that a
congressional statute violated the separation of powers doctrine by
directing the Court to decide a specific case in a specific way.'" The
Court determined that the statute, which directed the Supreme Court
to give a presidential pardon precisely the opposite value that the
Court had determined it to have, was unconstitutional because it "pre-
scribe[d] rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the govern-
ment in cases pending before it."' 33 The Court reasoned that Con-
gress's retroactive statute created no new legal circumstances. 134 The
Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that "Congress has inadvertently
passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power."'"
In Klein, the plaintiff, administrator of the estate of V.F. Wilson,
sought to repossess the proceeds of the decedent's cotton.' 36 The
Treasury Department seized the cotton pursuant to an 1863 congres-
sional statute directing it to take and sell all property either abandoned
by or seized from the Confederate forces.'" The statute also provided,
however, that individuals who remained loyal to the Union during the
war could recover their property.'" In December of 1863, the President
Jefferson seeking advice on U.S.-European relations. See PAUL M. BATOR ET Al,., HART AND
WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND TI1E FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-66 (3d. ed. 1988). The Supreme
Court informed Mr. Jefferson that the separation of powers doctrine dictated that the Court
cannot extrajudicially decide the questions submitted to it by the executive. Id. at 66-67. Since
Jefferson's efforts to obtain advice from the Supreme Court failed, the Attorney General has
served as the President's primary legal advisor. Id. at 71.
13° Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805, 811 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 397 (1980)).
131
 See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 406-07.
132 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1871).
133 /d. at 146, 147,
134 1d. at 147.
135 /d. The Klein Court also ruled that Congress had impermissibly encroached on the powers
of the President to issue pardons under Article I, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 148. Klein is also read for the rule that Congress may not manipulate the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction in order to secure unconstitutional ends. Lawrence Gene Sager, The Su-
preme Court 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARI/. L. REV. 17, 41 (1981).
136 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 136.
137 /d. at 130-31, 136.
134 1d. at 131.
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proclaimed that a full pardon and restoration of property rights would
be granted to individuals who took an oath of loyalty to the Union.'"
Prior to his death, Wilson took such an oath.'"
Based on the decedent's oath of loyalty, Klein brought suit. in the
Court of Claims seeking to have the cotton returned to him.'" The
court determined that Wilson's estate was entitled to receive the pro-
ceeds of the cotton.' 42 The United States appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which earlier that year affirmed a separate case on similar
facts. 14" Subsequent to the Court's decision in the earlier case, however,
Congress enacted a proviso to the appropriations bill of the Court of
Claims, declaring that a) presidential pardons were not proof of loyalty
to the United States Government and could not be used as evidence
of such in the Court of Claims; b) in cases where the Court of Claims
had already entered a favorable judgment for a claimant, the Supreme
Court was to dismiss any appeal for lack of jurisdiction; and c) the
Court of Claims was to treat a pardon as evidence of disloyalty.'" Thus,
in Klein, the United States argued that the Supreme Court should
remand the case to the Court of Claims with a mandate that it be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.'"
The Klein Court began by noting that under Article III, Congress
is free to limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in a particu-
lar class of cases.'" The Court determined, however, that Congress's
proviso here simply sought to withhold the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction as a means to an end.' 47 According to the Court, by denying
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in cases where a presiden-
tial pardon had been granted, Congress sought to contradict the value
the Supreme Court had already assigned to presidential pardons in the
earlier case. 148 Moreover, the Klein Court noted, Congress's provision
required the Supreme Court to assess the facts of a case and then,
determine that it lacked jurisdiction over the case.'" The Court con-
139 Id. at 131-32.
140 1d. at 132.
141 Klein, SO U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132,
142
'" Id. at 132-33. In the previous case, United States v. Padelford, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the presidential pardon made the plaintiff innocent in the eyes of the law and his
property was purged of any previous offense. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531,543 (1864).
144 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 133-34.
145 1d. at 134.
146 Id. at 145.
147 1d.
148 id.
148 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
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cluded that the congressional proviso directed the Court to decide
specific cases in specific ways, thereby violating the separation of pow-
ers.'"
In making its determination, the Klein Court distinguished its
1855 decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Cv. 1 J 1
 In
Wheeling Bridge, the Supreme Court had previously determined that a
low bridge was an obstruction to steamboat traffic, ordering that it be
either raised or razed.'" Congress subsequently passed a statute, how-
ever, declaring the bridge to be legal at its present height and making
it a post-road for mail delivery.'" The Wheeling Bridge Court held
Congress's act constitutional, declaring that although the bridge re-
mained an obstruction in fact, it no longer operated as such in law.'"
In distinguishing Wheeling Bridge, the Klein Court noted that,
unlike the current situation, Congress's act in Wheeling Bridge did not
constitute an arbitrary rule of decision.'" Rather, the Wheeling Bridge
Court was left to apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances
created by the congressional ac0 56 The Klein Court, on the other hand,
determined that no new circumstances were created by the congres-
sional proviso that instructed the Court to regard presidential pardons
as evidence of disloyalty.'" Rather, the Klein Court concluded that the
proviso barred the Court from giving the pardon the value that the
Court had previously determined the pardon deserved and was, in fact,
told to give that evidence precisely the opposite weight.'" Thus, the
Court held that Congress had crossed the line that separates the
legislature from the judiciary, in violation of the Constitution.' 59
Then, in 1980, in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, the
Supreme Court offered a broad reading of its opinion in Klein.' 60 The
15° /d. at 146.
151 /d. at 147; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 430
(1855).
152 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 429.
told.
"Id. at 430.
155 Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47,
156 1d. at 147.
1571d
150 Id.
15'i Id. At least one commentator has suggested that Klein does little more than hold that it
is an unconstitutional encroachment of the judicial function when Congress binds the Court to
reverse a decision of the lower court in accordance with an unconstitutional rule. BATOR ET AL.,
supra note 129, at 369. Another commentator notes that Klein's excessively broad statements have
allowed the case to be "viewed as nearly all things to all men." Gordon G. Young, Congressional
Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis.
L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1981).
150 448 U.S. 371, 405 (1980); Carol! Dorgan, Note, Section 2212: A Remedy for Veterans — With
a Catch, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1513, 1527 (1987).
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Sioux Nation Court held that a congressional statute that directly pro-
vided for Court of Claims review of a Sioux Nation 1877 takings claim
without regard to the res judicata or collateral estoppel effects of an
earlier claims court decision, did not violate the separation of powers
doctrine.' 6' The Sioux Nation Court reasoned that the statute in ques-
tion was distinguishable from the proviso in Klein, where Congress had
prescribed a rule for the decision of specific cases in a particular way.' 62
The Sioux Nation Court determined that the United States Govern-
ment, in its capacity as senior of the nation's debts, had merely waived
its res judicata defense in the subject litigation)' 13 The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that Congress had neither reversed the decisions of
the claims court nor prescribed the outcome of the Court of Claims
new review on the merits.' 64
The Sioux Nation Court began its opinion by questioning whether
the congressional statute violated the separation of powers on one of
two grounds.' 65 First, the Court considered whether Congress had upset
a final judgment of the claims court, thereby making it an advisory
opinion. 166
 Second, the Court asked whether Congress had violated
Klein by prescribing a rule of decision to the claims court—stripping
that court of its adjudicatory function. 16' In response to both of these
questions, the Court cited precedent that supported the Government's
161 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 407 (1980), In 1923, the Sioux
Nation filed petition in the Court of Claims alleging that the U.S. Government had taken the
Black Hills without providing just compensation to the Sioux. Id. at 384. In 1942, the Court of
Claims dismissed the Sioux' action, declaring that it lacked authorization to determine whether
the price given the Sioux by Congress in 1877 was adequate. Id. In 1046, however, Congress passed
a statute creating the Indian Claims Commission ("ICC") to serve as a new forum to hear and
determine all tribal grievances. Id. at 384-85. The Sioux submitted their claim to the ICC in 1950.
Id. at 385. After a series of procedural difficulties, the ICC, in 1974, finally determined that the
Court of Claims' 1942 decision did not serve as a res judicata bar to the Sioux' Fifth Amendment
takings claim, because the previous suit had been dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. Id. at
385-86. The ICC then found that the compensation awarded the Sioux in 1877 did not approxi-
mate the true value of the Black Hills and that the United States Government had, therefore,
effected a taking by eminent domain. Id. at 386. just compensation was, accordingly, owed to the
Sioux. Id. On appeal by the Government, the Court of Claims held that the Black Hills claim was
indeed barred by the res judicata effect of the 1942 decision. Id. at 386-87. Nevertheless, the
Court of Claims affirmed the ICC's ruling and held that, but for the res judicata effect of the
earlier decision, it would award the Sioux $17.5 million. Id. at 388.
162 Id. at 405.
155 /d. at 397, 405.
164 ./d. at 406.
166 Id. at 391.
164 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 391 (citing Hayburn's Case, 5 US. (2 Dail.) 409, 410-14 (1792)).
Although the Court raised the advisory opinion issue, it did not deal with it specifically because
the matter had been addressed in precedent. See Voting, supra note 159, at 1252.
167 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 392.
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ability to waive a substantive defense to a claim. 169 The Sioux Nation
Court also distinguished Klein, where the Court held that Congress
may not prescribe a rule of decision for cases pending before the
courts.' 69 The Court noted that in Klein, the fact that the Government
sought to determine the issue in its own favor was of obvious impor-
tance. 1 " Second, whereas the proviso in Klein sought to determine
particular cases in a particular way, Congress's waiver of a defense in
Sioux Nation did not affect the claims court's ability to determine the
takings claims on the merits.''' Thus, the Sioux Nation Court concluded
that Congress had not violated the separation of powers doctrine
because it neither "reviewed" a final judgment nor prescribed the
outcome of a case based on its merits.'"
Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that Congress could not con-
stitutionally require the Court of Claims to reopen a final judgment.'"
In essence, Justice Rehnquist asserted, Congress had reviewed the
earlier Court of Claims' judgment, set aside its ruling and ordered a
new trial.' 74
 Thus, Congress impermissibly exercised the judicial power
reserved to the courts in Article III of the Constitution.' 75 Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged that Congress may exercise its legislative pow-
ers by either limiting judicial jurisdiction or establishing new legal
rights after the date of a final judgment which alter that judgment's
impact.'" Nevertheless, he concluded, Congress may neither review
and set aside a court's final judgment nor order the retrial of a pre-
viously adjudicated issue.'"
In 1990, in Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson [hereinafter "Robert-
son .11, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied
on both Klein and Sioux Nation in determining that Congress had
168 ./d. at 397-402. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U.S. 476, 486 (1926)
(Congress may waive its res judicata defense on a prior judgment entered in the Government's
favor).
169 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 405 (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47
(1871)).
1701d.
171 Id. One commentator suggests that the Sioux Nation Court should have included in this
distinction from Klein the fact that the rule prescribed was itself unconstitutional as a usurpation
of executive power. See F1ATok ET nt., supra note 129, at 369 n.4.
172 Sioux Nation, 446 U.S. at 406-07. Having upheld the statute, the Sioux Nation Court then
proceeded to affirm the Court of Claims conclusion that the Sioux' land had been taken without
just compensation. Id. at 424. The Court of Claims' award was affirmed. Id.
173 Id. at 424-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 427.
175 ,td.
176 Id. at 429.
177 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 429.
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crossed the line that separates the legislature from the judiciary. 175 In
1989, the Seattle Audubon Society and several environmental groups
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States For-
est Service's timber management guidelines because the guidelines
afforded insufficient protection to the northern spotted owl.' 79 The
Washington Contract Loggers Association filed a separate suit charging
that the guidelines were overly restrictive of timber harvesting.'" Prior
to the district court's decision in either case, Congress passed § 318 of
the Department of the Interior Appropriations Act."' Subsection
(b) (6) (A) of this Act specifically referred to the two pending actions
and claimed that the land management standards set by subsections
(b) (3) and (b) (5) of the statute were adequate to meet the statutory
requirements underlying the two cases." 2
 The district court dismissed
the Audubon Society's claim under the statute and the environmental
group appealed to the Ninth Circuit.'"
In striking down the statute as unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit
noted that for the first time, Congress had directed the federal courts
to reach certain results in certain cases, identified by both name and
file number.'" The Ninth Circuit reasoned that although Congress may
amend or repeal any law, even with the express purpose of ending
litigation, Congress cannot require a certain case to come out in a
certain way when the legislation creates no new legal circumstances." 5
Thus, under this standard, the Ninth Circuit determined that subsec-
tion (b) (6) (A) violated the separation of powers doctrine because it
did not repeal or amend the environmental laws at. issue in the two
pending actions.'° Because the section directed the court to reach a
178 914 F.2d 1311, 1314, 1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1407,
1415 (1992) [hereinafter Robertson I].
179 Id. at 1313.
1811
181 Id.; Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 stn. 745-50 (1989).
182 Robertson /, 914 F.2d at 1313. Section 318(b) (6) (A) provides in pertinent part:
... Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according
to subsections (b)(3) and (b) (5) of this section ,
	 is adequate consideration for
the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basics for [the two
cases].
Id. Subsection (b) (3) of the statute designated certain Forest Service lands as protected areas for
the spotted owl. Subsection (b)(5) identified similarly protected areas of Bureau of Land Man-
agement land.
183 Robertson /, 914 F.2d at 1313-14.
' 84 1d. at 1314.
1 "/d. at 1315 (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 flow.)
421, 430 (1855)) (quoting United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871 )) .
188 /d. at 1316.
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specific result based on specific factual findings the court held that the
act clearly violated Klein.' 87
On appeal, in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, [hereinafter
"Robertson In , the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Ninth Circuit."8 In a unanimous opinion, the Court determined
that subsection (b) (6) (A) did indeed compel changes in the law rather
than directing findings under old law. 189
 The Court reasoned that
Congress replaced the legal standards underlying the two actions and
substituted them with those enacted in subsections (b) (3) and (b) (5),
without directing the actual applications of these standards.'" The
Court concluded that subsection (b) (6) (A) modified old provisions
and did effect a change in the law.' 9 '
Thus, in Robertson II, the Supreme Court was presented with a
statute that directly referred to pending litigation and claimed that the
statute met the legal requirements underlying those cases."' Although
the Ninth Circuit held that the statute violated Klein because it directed
the court to reach a specific result based on factual findings, the
United States Supreme Court reversed.' 93 The Court held that the
statute did change the law and therefore did not violate the separation
of powers.' 94
 Because the Court reached this conclusion, it declined to
address the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Klein.'95
In sum, under our scheme of separated powers, Congress prom-
ulgates laws and courts apply the law existing at the time of decision.'"
According to Wheeling Bridge, Congress can amend or repeal any law,
even for the purpose of ending litigation.' 97 In Klein, the Court deter-
mined, however, that Congress may not prescribe a rule of decision for
specific cases in specific ways. 198 The Sioux Nation Court read Klein as
proscribing congressional direction of the outcome of judicial cases,
based on the merits.'" If, therefore, the Court determines that a
congressional statute changes the law rather than directs findings
187 Id.
188 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (1992) [hereinafter Robertson II].
1 E19 Id. at 1413.
190 Id.
nil
 Id. at 1414.
192
 Id. at 1412.
I9N Robertson II, 112 S. Ct. at 1415.
194 /d. at 1414.
195 Id.
196 See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (when a case is
on appeal and Congress changes the underlying law, courts must adhere to that law).
1.97 See Robertson I, 914 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990), rey'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1407,
1415 (1992).
198 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
199 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 407 (1980).
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under old law, no violation of the separation of powers doctrine will
be found."°
B. Determinations of the Courts on § 27A's Constitutionality
Congress's enactment of § 27A led to a groundswell of cases in
jurisdictions throughout the country, aimed at determining whether
§ 27A's denial of Lampf's effects to a discrete number of cases violates
the separation of powers doctrine.m To date, most courts confronted
with the question of whether Congress's statute impermissibly en-
croaches on the judiciary's realm have concluded that the separation
of powers doctrine is not violated. 2°2 Nevertheless, a significant number
of courts have reached the opposite conclusion and have, therefore,
refused to apply the statute. 20'
1. Section 27A is Unconstitutional
Some courts holding that § 27A is unconstitutional maintain that
the statute directs a rule of decision in the limited number of cases
affected by the Lampf decision's retroactive application, without chang-
ing the underlying law. 204 Other courts have held that the statute
impermissibly reinstates cases dismissed by the courts in a final judg-
ment."' Finally, several courts have contended that the statute directs
201) Robertson II, 112 S. Ct. at 1414.
201 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 13, at 18.
202 E.g., Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., No. 91-16907, 92-15986, 92-15901, 92-16193, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 6995, at *29 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1993); Berning v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, No.
91-3318, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6074, at *23-24 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 1993); Henderson v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1992); Anixter II, 977 F.2d 1533, 1547 (10th Cir.
1992), cert. denied sub nom. Dennler v. Trippet, 61 U.S.L.W. 3714 (1993); In re Integrated
Resources Real Estate Ltd. Partnership Sec. Litig., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 97,311,
at 95,541 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1993); Aquilio v. Manakcr, [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 97,265,
at 95,198 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1992); Dendinger v. First Nat'l Corp., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) § 97,268, at 95,224 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 1992); Axel Johnson, Inc. v, Arthur Andersen & Co.,
790 F. Supp. 476, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In addition, although the issue of § 27A's constitutionality
has not yet been presented to the United States Court of Appeals l'o•the Second Circuit, that
court, in dicta, has indicated that it is "unimpressed" with the analysis of those courts that have
struck the statute down. Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loch, Inc., 967 F.2d, 742, 751 n.6
(2d Cir. 1992).
205 E.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republickbank Corp., 806 F. Stipp, 108, 115 (N.D.
'lex. 1992); Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Johnston v. Cigna Corp.,
789 F. Supp. 1098, 1100 (D. Colo. 1992); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 F.
Supp. 1092, 1098 (D. Colo. 1992); Plain v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 235 (E.D.
Ky. 1992); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 E Supp. 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
20 ' 1 E.g., Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097; Brichard, 788 F. Stipp. at 1105.
205 E.g., Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1062; Maul, 789 F. Supp. at 235; Brichard, 788 F. Stipp. at
1107.
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the courts to ignore a constitutionally based decision of the United
States Supreme Court. 206
In March 1992, in In re Brichard Securities Litigation, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, deter-
mined that § 27A violates the separation of powers doctrine. 207
 In
September 1991, the court dismissed the plaintiff's § 10(b) claim as
untimely due to the Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf and Beam, which
retroactively imposed a one-and-three year statute of limitations on
private actions brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 208 Pursuant to
Congress's enactment of § 27A, plaintiffs made a motion to the court
to reinstate their claim. 209
 The Brichard court denied the plaintiff's
motion, however, reasoning that because § 27A was unconstitutional,
the plaintiffs claim was time barred. 21 °
The Brichard court articulated three reasons for striking down the
statute.2 " First, the court concluded that § 27A(a) did not change the
law, but rather directed that the Lampf ruling could not be applied
retroactively. 212
 Thus, like the statute in Klein, § 27A intrudes on the
adjudicative function of the courts by directing a rule of decision in
pending cases.mSecond, the court determined that § 27(b) impermis-
sibly directs courts to reverse final judgments. 214
 Finally, the court
reasoned that § 27A changes the constitutional rule announced by the
Supreme Court in Beam, in contravention of separation of powers
doctrine.215 Thus, the Brichard court determined that § 27A is uncon-
stitutional. 216
In the wake of the Richard decision, a number of district court
cases have also determined that § 27A violates the separation of powers
doctrine.217
 Although these courts have struck the statute down, they
256 E.g., Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1111-12; TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. 587, 594
(ED. La. 1992).
2117 Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1112.
258 Id. at 1100-01.
209 Id. at 1100.
21° Id. at 1112.
211 Id. at 1104-12.
212 Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1104.
213
 Id. at 1105.
214 Id. at 1106.
215 /d. at 1108.
216
 /d. at 1112.
217
 E.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republickbank Corp., 806 E Supp. 108, 115 (N.D.
Tex. 1992); Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (E.D. Mich, 1992); Johnston v. Cigna Corp..
789 E Supp. 1098, 1100 (D. Colo. 1992); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 F.
Supp. 1092, 1098 (D. Colo, 1992); Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 E Supp. 231, 235 (E.D.
Ky. 1992); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Sabino, supra note
13, at 39.
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have not all adopted each of the three rationales set forth by the
Brichard court.218 This note, therefore, will discuss these cases in turn
as they add relevant reasoning to the Brichard court's rationale.
a. Section 27A Directs Outcomes in Specific Gases Without Changing the
Underlying Law
The Brichard court began its analysis by noting that the Supreme
Court has approved of legislation that retroactively affects rights of
litigants if the legislation's retroactive application has a rational basis. 2 t 9
According to the Brichard court, the Supreme Court has also acknow-
ledged that Congress may enact legislation that affects pending cases.22°
Nevertheless, the court determined, Congress may not usurp the judi-
ciary's role by adjudicating cases."' Therefore, the Brichard court held
that Congress may not enact legislation that prescribes a rule of deci-
sion to courts in pending cases without changing the underlying sub-
stantive or procedural law. 222
The Brichard court then determined that § 27A failed to change
the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Lampf.223
 Instead, the
court found that § 27A, which instructs that the statute of limitations
to be applied to a § 10(b) action is the one existing in its respective
jurisdiction the day before Lampf was decided, merely limits the retro-
active application of the one-and-three year limitations period set forth
in Lamp/224 Thus,the court concluded, § 27A tells courts what rule
21 "Sabino, supra note 13, at 39. The Brichard court's rejection of § 27A provides the must
exhaustive analysis of the issue. 1L at 34.
215
 lirichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1102 (quoting United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 64
(1989)).
220 a (citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, 110 (1801)).
221 Id.
222 Id. (citing United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 405 (1980); United
States v Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871); Robertson I, 914 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990),
reo'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (1992). The Brichard court provided subsequent
procedural history for Robertson I, asserting that the case had been reversed on oilier grounds,
thereby implying that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Klein and Sioux Nation was not
overturned by the Supreme Court's decision in Robertson IL Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1102.
223 Brichard 788 F. Stipp. at 1103-04.
224 Id. at 1104. The Brichard court supported this conclusion by lOcusing on the statute's
legislative history, finding that it "resonateidr with Congress's concern over the high profile
insider trading cases which would be dismissed as a result of Lamb': M. at 1104-05. The court
concluded that when Congress was unable to garner enough support rbr a wholesale change
of the Lampf statute of limitations, it merely instructed courts not to apply it in a finite number
of cases without changing the underlying rule. Id. at 1106. One commentator has rioted, how-
ever, that the Brichard court's reliance on floor debates is improper. See Sabino, supra note 13,
at 59-60. Mr. Sabino asserts that the Supreme Court has consistently disapproved of the use of
bill Committee Reports as an authoritative source of legislative intent. M. at 60.
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may not be applied without enacting a new law. 225
 The court held that
Congress's failure to change the law violated Klein, which, according
to the Brichard court, held that Congress may not direct the adjudica-
tive process without changing a substantive or procedural rule."' The
Brichard court determined that without changing the underlying law,
Congress may not direct rules of decision to the courts in pending
cases."' Thus, the court held that the statute was unconstitutional."'
In March 1992, in Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado also concluded
that § 27A was unconstitutional because it. failed to change the law."'"
The Bank of Denver court began its analysis by noting that in Klein, the
Supreme Court held that the congressional proviso denying presiden-
tial pardons the effect that the Court had found them to have was
unconstitutional because the proviso directed the Court's decision in
a case without changing the underlying law.230 The Bank of Denver court
reasoned that in Lampf, the Supreme Court, in an exercise of its
constitutional duty to interpret the laws, adopted a one-and-three year
statute of limitations."' In enacting § 27A, however, Congress did not
change the law by enacting an express statute of limitations and apply-
ing it retroactively. 232
 Instead, the court determined, Congress selected
a discrete category of federal cases and instructed lower courts hearing
these cases to ignore the Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf.233 Thus,
the Bank of Denver court held that § 27A is directly analogous to the
unconstitutional statute in Klein and declined to reinstate plaintiff's
claim:434
The Bank of Denver court then determined that it was irrelevant
that § 27A did not explicitly dictate a decision on the merits of § 10(b)
claims. The court noted that the proviso in Klein did not direct a
specific decision on the merits of plaintiff's claim for return of prop-
erty. 235 Rather, the Klein proviso provided the Supreme Court with the
225 Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1104.
225 Id. at 1105.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 1112.
222 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Colo. 1992). Because the Bank of Denver court found the
statute to be unconstitutional, it denied reinstatement of plaintiff's claim under § 10(h) and Rule
10b-5. Id. at 1093-94.
23°
 Id. at 1096-97.
"I Id. at 1097.
232 Id.
233 Id. The court reasoned that Congress should have employed its legitimate check on the
Supreme Court's power by enacting a new statute of limitations in § 10(b) cases and applying it
retroactively. Id.
234 Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp, at 1097.
235 Id.
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interpretive rule that presidential pardons were evidence of disloy-
alty."" Similarly, the court determined, § 27A provides courts with the
interpretive rule that the jurisdictional statute of limitations existing
on June 19, 1991, must be applied. 237 Both statutes, the court con-
cluded, prescribe an interpretation that is contrary to prior Supreme
Court law, and thus, the court held that § 27A is unconstitutional.'"
Then, in May 1992, in Johnston v. Cigna Corporation, the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado declined to reconsider
its Bank of Denver ruling in light of the United States Supreme Court's
March 25, 1992 decision in Robertson II, where the Court held that the
Interior Appropriations Act represented a change in the law and there-
fore did not violate Klein."' The Johnston court determined that § 27A
was entirely different from the statute at issue in Robertson IP" First,
the Robertson II statute made clear that compliance would constitute
compliance with several previously existing statutes. 2"t Section 27A,
however, attempted to overturn the Supreme Court's interpretation of
§ 10(b).242 Second, whereas the statute in Robertson II prospectively
dictated a set of rules to apply to future timber harvesting in a limited
geographical area, § 27A's effect was purely retroactive. 243 Holding that
§ 27A's sole purpose is to "select a limited body of pending federal
cases for resurrection from the death knell sounded by Lampf," the
court concluded that Robertson II did not alter its previous determina-
tion on the statute's constitutionality."'
b. 27A(b) Upsets Final Judgments of the Courts
As a second prong of its analysis, the Brichard court focused spe-
cifically on § 27A(b), which orders courts to reinstate § 10(b) actions
instituted prior to June 19, 1991,  which were dismissed as a result of
236 Id.
237
2" Id. The court went on to conclude that § 27A also violates general separation of power
principles, in addition to its breach of Klein, Id. The court noted that § 27A impermissibly
encroaches on the judiciary branch by directing courts to apply the Larnpfdoctrine in some cases
while ignoring it in others. Id. at 1097-98. The court determined that without changing the law,
Congress cannot "erase binding Supreme Court precedent by legislative fiat," Id, at 1098.
289 789 E Stipp. 1098,1100 (1). Colo. 1992). The same judge decided both Bank of Denver
and Johnston. Johnston, 789 F. Stipp. at 1099; Bank of Denver, 789 F. Stipp. at 1093.
"'Johnston, 789 F. Stipp. at 1101, The Johnston court noted that. the Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Robertson I because the Court determined that the statute in
question changed the law. Id. For this reason, the Johnston court held, the Supreme Court
declined to comment on the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Klein. Id.
241 Id. at 1101-02.
242 1d. at 1102.
213 Id.
"'Johnston, 789 F. Supp. at 1102.
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the Supreme Court's Lampf opinion. 245
 The court reasoned that in
addition to Congress's failure to amend the underlying law, Congress
had committed a greater separation of powers violation with § 27A(b)
which impermissibly directs courts to reverse final judgments. 246 The
court noted, in fact, that the plaintiffs in the Lampf decision itself had
been successful in reinstating their claim pursuant to § 27A(b). 247 Nev-
ertheless, the court concluded that Congress cannot upset the final
judgments of either the Supreme Court or lower federal courts. 248
Thus, the court determined that § 27A(b) was constitutionally imper-
missible because it both reduced decisions of the court to mere advi-
sory opinions and, as an act of legislative review, intruded upon the
exclusive power of the judiciary to adjudicate cases. 249
In June 1992, in Treiber v. Katz, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan also concluded that § 27A was
unconstitutional because it upset final judgments of a court. 25" The
Treiber court began its analysis by noting that § 27A(b) retroactively
changed the statute of limitations for cases that were no longer pend-
ing before the courts. 251
 The court acknowledged that parties have no
vested rights in statutes of limitation.252
 Nevertheless, the court deter-
mined that Supreme Court doctrine does hold that once final judg-
ments are issued, the rights of the litigants are vested and the legisla-
ture no longer has power to alter those rights. 253
 Thus, the Treibercourt
245 hi re Brichard Sec. Ling., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
246 Id.
247
 Id. at 1107 n.9 (citing Gilbertson v. Leasing Consultants Assocs., No. 86-1369-RE (D. Or.
Feb. 6, 1992)).
248 /d. at 1107.
249 1d.
25°796 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1992). Because the Treiber court determined that
§ 27A is unconstitutional, it declined to reinstate plaintiffs previously dismissed complaint that
alleged that defendant's offer of limited partnerships in a Dallas apartment complex violated
§ 10(b) and Rule 10h-5. Id. at 1055. In considering the constitutionality of the statute, the court
found that § 27A does not prescribe specific rules for deciding cases in a specific way. Id. at 1058.
The court concluded, therefore, that Klein was not violated by the statute. Id. at 1059. The court's
holding that the statute is unconstitutional, therefbre, rests specifically on subsection (b), which,
according to the court, impertnissibly directs courts to reverse final judgments. Id. at 1062.
251 /d. at 1059.
252 Id. at 1060 (citing Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945)). In Chase,
the United States Supreme Court determined that a state statute that lifted the bar of a statute
of limitation in a pending claim was not a taking, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 325 U.S. at 314. The Court reasoned that statutes of limitations represent a privilege
to litigate, not a fundamental right, and are thus subject to a large degree of legislative control.
Id. The Chase Court did not, however, address the situation presented by § 27A—namely the
dismissal of a lawsuit on the grounds that it is untimely and its subsequent reinstatement See id.
at 310.
253 Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1061. This doctrine relies, inter alia, on the principle of separation
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determined, parties do have vested rights in the final judgment of a
court dismissing a § I0(b) suit brought against them and this right
cannot be constitutionally divested. 254
 Moreover, the court stated, if
Congress could set aside final judgments, judicial rulings would be-
come simple advisory opinions. 255
The 'Treiber court then rejected the government's argument that
because § 27A(b) merely reinstates a dismissal on statute of limitations
grounds, rather than on the merits, the legislation does not effect
vested rights. 256
 The court disagreed with the government's argument
that Sioux Nation, where the Supreme Court upheld a congressional
statute waiving the res judicata effect of a prior judgment rendered in
the government's favor, stands for the proposition that only statutes
that reverse merit-based final judgments violate the separation of pow-
ers doctrine. 2" The court determined that this reading of Sioux Nation
was overly broad."' Instead, the Treiber court limited Sioux Nation to
the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of Congress's broad power to
pay the nation's debts. 259
The Treiber court then distinguished § 27A from the statute at
issue in Sioux Nation. 26° First, rather than waiving a defense on the
government's behalf, § 27A waives the defense of private litigants. 26 '
Furthermore, the court noted, in passing § 27A, Congress did not
ground its authority in its power to pay the nation's debts. 2"2 The Treiber
court held, therefore, that § 27A is unconstitutional because it imper-
missibly seeks to alter a final judgment 263
c. Section 27A Changes the Constitutional Law Enunciated in Beam
Finally, in Bri chard, the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California determined that even if § 27A did change the
law and did not reverse final judgments, it still failed to pass constitu-
of powers that prohibits legislative review of judicial actions. Id. at 1060. The Treiber court also
noted that the "vested rights" doctrine has a due process component based on the fact that once
rights are fixed by judgment, they become a form of property. Id. The legislature, according to
the court, has no greater right over this type of property than it does over any other. Id.
251
 Id. at 1061.
255 Id.
251 ' Id. The United States filed a statement of interest. Id.
257 a
256 Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1001.
255 hi,
260 Id,
261 hit.
262 id.
269 Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1062.
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tional muster because it changed the constitutional rule announced
in Beam, that similarly situated litigants must be treated the same. 264
The Brichard court maintained that the Beam Court's rejection of
selective prospectivity in the civil context relied heavily on precedent
that stated that selective prospectivity in criminal cases was unconstitu-
tional. 265 The Brichard court further noted that the concurring opin-
ions in Beam, wherein Justices Scalia and Blackmun separately main-
tained that selective prospectivity was constitutionally proscribed, lent
weight to the conclusion that the Beam decision, as a whole, was
constitutionally based.266 The court then determined that even if the
language of the Beam decision implied that the Justices relied on the
non-constitutional dimensions of judicial power in making their rul-
ing, because the judicial power is rooted in Article III, selective
prospectivity raises a constitutional question. 267 Ultimately, the court
concluded that despite the fact that the constitutional grounds for the
Beam decision were somewhat mixed, the case was, nevertheless based
on the Constitution.268 Because Congress may not pass a law that
overrides the Supreme Court's determination of the Constitution, the
court held that § 27A was unconstitutional. 269
TGX Corp. v. Simmons, a March 1992 decision of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, also held that Beam
was a constitutionally based decision and that § 27A was, therefore,
unconstitutional because it contravened Beam's ruling.270 Because the
TGX court determined that Beam stands for the proposition that selec-
tive prospectivity is unconstitutional, it went on to hold that § 27A,
264 See In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1108 (N.D. Cat. 1992).
265 /d. at 1110 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)). See supra note 80 for
a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Gnffith.
266 788 F. Supp. at 1110. Justice Scalia argued that the principle against selective prospectivity
derives from Article III, § 1 of the United States Constitution. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun maintained that
the Beam decision was required by judicial responsibility, for to do otherwise would "warp the
role that ... judges play in government." Id. at 2450 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
267 Brichard, 788 F. Su pp. at 1110.
268 /d. at 1111-12.
26° Id. at 1112 (citing Min-bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 147, 177 (1803)).
270 786 F. Supp. 587, 594 (E.D. La. 1992). Pursuant to § 27A(b), the plaintiffs, the Simmons,
sought to reinstate their § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims against defendant, TGX, Corp., for failing
to disclose the existence of a lawsuit pending against TGX, which significantly devalued the
company's stock. Id. at 589. The TGX court began its discussion by rejecting the argument that
§ 27A failed to change the law. Id. at 592. Instead, the court determined that Congress changed
the law, but it had done so in a matter "inconsistent with the constitutional mandate" established
by Beam. Id. at 591. Accordingly, the court held that § 27A violated the principle of separation
of powers. Id.
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which limits Lampf to prospective application only, contravenes that
constitutional principle. 271
 According to the court, § 27A essentially
requires courts to treat similarly situated litigants dissimilarly, in viola-
tion of Beam. 272 The TGX court concluded that § 27A violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. 273
Thus, there are three bases that underlie the decision of courts
that § 27A is unconstitutional. 274
 First, some courts have held that
§ 27A does not enact a substantive or procedural law. 275
 Instead, these
courts have determined that § 27A intrudes upon the judiciary's func-
tion by ordering courts not to apply the Supreme Court's Lampf ruling
in a discrete number of cases.'" Thus, these courts have determined
that the statute, like the unconstitutional proviso in Klein, directs
courts to determine specific cases in a specific way without changing
the underlying law. 271
 Other courts have struck down subsection (b) of
the statute, which directs courts to reinstate those cases dismissed as
time-barred under Lampf, by determining that the separation of pow-
ers doctrine is violated when Congress alters final decisions of the
courts. 278
Finally, some courts have invalidated the statute on the grounds
that Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine by ordering
courts to apply the Lampf decision to some cases and not to others. 2"
These courts have concluded that § 27A directs courts to violate the
prohibition of selective prospectivity articulated in Beam, wherein the
Supreme Court determined that similarly situated litigants must be
treated the same. 28° Because these courts have determined that the
Supreme Court's decision in Beam was based on the Court's interpre-
tation of the Constitution, they conclude that Congress has ordered
271 /d. at 594.
272 1d.
273 Id.
274 See Oberly & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 47-49; Block & Hoff, supra note 13, at 10.
275 E.g., Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Colo.
1992); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
276
 E.g., Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097; Brichard 788 F. Supp. at 1103.
277 E.g., Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097; I3richard 788 F. Supp. at 1105.
278 Eg., Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Stipp. 1054, 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Johnston v. Cigna Corp.,
789 F. Stipp. 1098, 1100 (D. Colo. 1992); Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1107.
279 E.g., Pacific Mutual Life Ins, Co. v. First. Rcpublicbank Corp., 806 F. Supp. 108, 115 (N.D.
Tex. 1992) (Section 27A breaches a constitutional principle because source of Beam holding can
be none other than the Constitution); Briehard, 788 F. Stipp. at 1108 (same); TGX corp. v.
Simmons, 786 F. Supp. 587, 594 (E.D. La. 1992) (same).
289 E.g„ Pacific Mutual, 806 F, Supp. at 115; Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1108; TGX, 786 F. Supp.
at 594.
884	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:853
lower courts to ignore a Supreme Court constitutional interpreta-
tion.28 '
2. Section 27A is Constitutional
Courts that have upheld the constitutionality of § 27A have
reached three contrary conclusions in their support of the statute. 282
Initially, these courts have determined that § 27A changes the law by
prescribing a new statute of limitations that the courts must apply to
§ 10(b) litigation instituted prior to June 19, 1991 and thus is unlike
the proviso at issue in K/ein.283
 More importantly, these courts have
determined that § 27A does not violate Klein because it does not direct
the outcome in those cases. 284 Many courts have also rejected the
challenge that § 27A(b) is unconstitutional because it orders the rein-
statement of final judgments, concluding instead that Sioux Nation
indicates that Congress may, in some instances, offer relitigation of a
decided claim. 285 Finally, courts have addressed the argument that
§ 27A orders lower courts to ignore the constitutional mandate of
Beam by countering that Beam was not a constitutional decision. 286
In August 1992, in Anixter v. Home Stake Production Co. [hereinaf-
ter Anixter II], the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that § 27A does not violate separation of powers doctrine and,
therefore the court reinstated plaintiffs § 10(b) claim.287 The Tenth
Circuit had previously reversed a $130 million judgment in the plain-
tiffs favor as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Lampps The
281 E.g., Pactfic Mutual, 806 F. Supp. at 115; Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1108; TGX, 786 F. Supp.
at 594.
282 	Anixter II, 977 F.2d 1533, 1543-47 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Dennler v.
Trippet, 61 U.S.L.W. 3714 (1993); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1571-73
(11th Cir. 1992).
2113 E.g., Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1545; Axel Johnson v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp.
476, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
214 E.g., Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1545; Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573; Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp.
at 479.
265 Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1546; Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 481.
286 E.g., Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1547; Ash v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1473,
1477 (E.D. Cal. 199'2).
287 977 F.2d at 1547.
288 Id. at 1542. The plaintiffs originally sued alleging that the defendant, Home-Stake Pro-
duction Co., a developer of oil and gas properties, defrauded investors by offering them bogus
tax deductions and capital investment plans. Anixter I, 939 F.2d 1420, 1430 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted and judgment vacated sub nom, Dennler v. Trippet, 112 S. Ct. 1658 amended 112 S. Ct.
1757 (1992). A jury trial resulted in a $130 million verdict. Id. On appeal, however, the Tenth
Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' suit as untimely pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Lampf. Id. at 1442.
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United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to plaintiffs appeal
and subsequently vacated and remanded the earlier decision, instruct-
ing the lower court to reconsider the matter in light of § 27A. 1"
On reconsideration, the Anixter II court addressed whether § 27A
violates the separation of powers doctrine. 2"0 The court, however, re-
jected all three rationales supporting the argument that § 27A is un-
constitutional."' First, the court noted that § 27A reflects Congress's
legislative capacity to change the law. 292
 Moreover, the court deter-
mined, § 27A neither directs courts to make specific factual findings
nor mandates particular case results.298
 Second, the court upheld the
power of Congress to alter statutes of limitation, even after a final
judgment has been rendered."' Finally, the court rejected the defen-
dant's assertions that Beam was a constitutionally based decision."'
As in the previous section, this Note discusses Anixter II together
with the rationales advanced by other courts that have upheld § 27A.
Relevant arguments from other courts will be added to the text as they
enhance the discussions of the Anixter II court.
a. Section 27A Changes the Law by Creating a New Statute of
Limitations and Does Not Direct Specific Findings
The Anixter II court began its analysis by considering the defen-
dant's argument that § 27A does not change existing law or create new
law, but simply instructs courts to decide specific cases in a particular
fashion. 28
 The court rejected this argument, concluding that § 27A was
distinguishable from the proviso in Klein that had directed courts to
make specific factual findings in specific cases without changing the
underlying law.297
 Instead, the court concluded, § 27A changes the law
by prescribing a new statue of limitations that the courts must apply to
those cases instituted prior to June 19, 1991. 2 • 8
Moreover, the Anixter II court determined, regardless of any am-
2" Delder, 112 S. Ct. at 1757.
21- ° Anixier II, 977 F.2d at 1542. The Anixter II court ordered the parties to address the
decisions of the District of Colorado and the Eastern District of Louisiana, respectively in Bank
of Denver and TCX. Id.
291 Id. at 1543-48.
292 14. al 1542.
293
 Id. at 1545.
291 Id. at 1546.
29r' Anixter II, 977 E2d at 1547.
2 • 13 Id, at 1544.
297 M. at 1545.
295 M. There is little question that Congress may change the law and impose that change
retroactively. Id. (citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, 110 (1801)).
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biguities arising from the Supreme Court's decision in Klein, the Su-
preme Court's Robertson. II opinion convinced the circuit court that
§ 27A changed the law and did not direct findings under old law. 299
According to the court, § 27A was similar to the statute in Robertson II
in that it modified an old provision and neither directed specific
factual findings nor compelled a rule of decision in private actions
brought under § 10(b). 30° Rather, the court held, § 27A "merely turns
back the legal clock" to the time just before Lampf was decided and
allows courts to make independent judgments based on the law as they
determined it existed on June 19, 1991. 301
 The court held that in
enacting § 27A, Congress acted within its legitimate power to change
a rule of law and to retroactively apply the new rule to pending cases. 302
In September 1992, in Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., a di-
vided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit also upheld the .
 constitutionality of § 27A under this theory." 3
Under § 27A, the plaintiffs in Henderson sought to reinstate their $370
million class action against the defendant, Scientific-Atlanta, charging
omissions, misstatements and misrepresentations that fraudulently
inflated the value of the defendant's stock." Like the Anixter II court,
the Henderson court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in
Robertson II in determining that § 27A implemented a change in the
law. 305
 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that because § 27A does not
direct particular findings of fact in particular cases it does not violate
the doctrine of separation of powers. 306
b. Statute Does Not Upset Final Judgments
As a second rationale for its holding, the Anixter II court rejected
the defendant's argument that the court's previous dismissal of plain-
299 Id.
sou Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1545.
sal Id. (quoting Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (S.D.N.Y 1992)
(holding that § 27A does not violate the separation of powers doctrine)).
"2 Id. at 1545-46.
sa3 971 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1992),
304 Id. at 1569. The district court had previously granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' suit as time-barred under Lampf. Id.
905 1d. at 1573.
3{16 Id. The Henderson court went on to reject the arguments advanced by defendants that
§ 27A violated both the clue process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
at 1574. In a dissent, Senior Circuit Court Judge Wellford agreed that neither of the Fifth
Amendment challenges to § 27A had merit. Id. at 1575 (Wellford, J., dissenting).Judge Wellford
did argue, however, that those district courts that reached the conclusion that § 27A violated the
separation of powers doctrine were correct. Id. at 1575-76 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
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tiff's § 10(b) claim gave the defendants a vested right in the finality of
the judgment.'°? The court concluded that given Congress's domain
over the enactment of statute of limitations, the issue of § 27A's con-
stitutionality resembled the question at issue in Sioux Nation, where
the Supreme Court upheld congressional legislation waiving the gov-
ernment's res judicata defense over a prior judgment. 308 The Tenth
Circuit determined that legislation which changes a technical defense
"goes far less to the heart of the judicial function" than legislation
which attempts to alter decisions based on the actual merits of a case.'"
Moreover, the court noted, vested rights are not created by a statute
of limitations. 3 ' 0 Thus, the court concluded that the enactment of
§ 27A was a legitimate exercise of legislative power.'"
In April 1992, in Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York also
rejected the defendants' argument that § 27A(b) was unconstitu-
tional.312 The defendants argued that § 27A(b) constituted impermis-
sible legislative reversal of a final judicial decision in contravention of
separation of powers."'" The Axel Johnson court determined, however,
that neither case law nor separation of powers doctrine required the
preclusive effect urged by defendants.'" Noting that the Supreme
Court's holding in Sioux Nation was not entirely on point, the court
nevertheless determined that Sioux Nation stands for the proposition
that Congress may, in some instances, offer relitigation of decided
The Axel Johnson court also cited several factors which weighed
against the defendants' separation of powers argument.''° First, the fact
307 977.F.2(1 1533,1546 (10111 Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Den tiler v. Trippet, 6I U.S.L.W.
3714 (1993).
WA id.
3°9 Id. (quoting Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Stipp. 476,483 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
310 Anix/er //, 977 F.2d at 1546 (citing Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,315-16
(1945)).
311 Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1546,
312 790 F. Supp. at 483. The Axel Johnson decision also addressed the argument that § 27A
directs a rule of decision for those cases filed prior to June 19,1991, without changing the law
prospectively. Id. at 478-79. Like the Anixter II and Henderson courts, however, the Axel Johnson
court determined that the Supreme Court's holding in Robertson 11 underscored the fact that
§ 27A constituted a change in the underlying law. Id. at 480.
313 Id. at 480. In oral argument, the defendants also argued that reinstatement of the
plaintiff's claim would deprive the defendant of the due process rights obtained when plaintiff's
suit against defendant was initially dismissed. Id. The court rejected this argument. Id. at 483.
314 14. at 481.
315 hi.
" 6 Id, at 482.
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that such a short time transpired between the final judgments dismiss-
ing the cases and the enactment of § 27A indicated that Congress had
not seriously intruded into the realm of the judiciary, particularly in
light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which provides that a
court may relieve a party from final judgment. 31 Second, the fact that
the courts dismissed the previous cases on technical grounds, rather
than on the merits of the case, weighed in favor of allowing the cases
to be reinstated."' Third, ruling that § 27A(b) was unconstitutional
would impose too great a burden on plaintiffs."' In essence, the court
noted, invalidating § 27A(b) would further penalize those plaintiffs
whose cases were dismissed but would have no effect on plaintiffs
whose cases had not yet been time-barred. 32° Finally, the court deter-
mined that Congress provided relief for a broad class of claimants from
what it regarded as an unfair decision, regardless of where in the
judicial pipeline the plaintiffs' respective cases fell.:321 The court rea-
soned that this evenhanded treatment of the plaintiffs' claims was less
threatening to the judiciary's independence than a congressional ac-
tion that reversed specific litigation?" Accordingly, the court deter-
mined that § 27A(b) was consistent with the principles of separation
of powers and plaintiff's claim should, therefore, be reinstated. 32'
c. Beam Was Not a Constitutionally Based Decision
Finally, in response to the defendant's contention that § 27A vio-
lated the constitutional mandate of Beam, the Anixter //court held that
Beam was not constitutionally based. 324 Rather, the court noted that
"Beam was carefully crafted to garner a plurality to agree only that
retroactive application of a rule of law announced in a case [is] a
matter of a choice of law and not of constitutional import." 325 The court
317 790 F. Supp. at 482. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) stating that the court may relieve a
party from a final judgment [for] ... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment [where a motion is made] within a reasonable time ...."
318 Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 482. The court went on to note that in light of the changing
limitary periods surrounding the instant litigation, defendant could not legitimately argue that
it relied on the Lampflimitary period. Id. at 483. Indeed, the court noted that the Lampfclecision
operated as a windfall for defendant Arthur Andersen which was in the midst of defending
plaintiff's § 10(b) claim when that claim was time-barred. Id.
319 1d. at 483.
32° hi
321 Id.
3 '22 Id.
323
 Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 483.
324 Anixter II, 977 F.2d 1533, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Den:11er v. Trippet,
61 G.S.L.IN, 3714 (1993).
32'5 Id. See raw James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2448 (1991) ("[t] he
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concluded that Beam did not declare that the practice of selective
prospectivity was unconstitutional and, therefore, Congress did not
violate the separation of powers by ordering that Lampf be applied to
some cases but not to others."'
In September 1992, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of California in Ash v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. offered a
detailed treatment of the non-constitutional basis of Beam. 327
 Under
§ 10(b), the plaintiffs sued Dean Witter for the actions of one of its
brokers, who encouraged the plaintiffs to invest in a tax shelter without
advising the plaintiffs that the shelter had not been approved by Dean
Witter."' The Ash court acknowledged that the Beam Court's opinion
noted that the doctrine of selective prospectivity in criminal cases,
which was held by the Supreme Court in an earlier case to be uncon-
stitutional, could not be confined to just criminal law."' Nevertheless,
the court determined, the Beam opinion never mentioned either Arti-
cle III or the Constitution."° Furthermore, the court noted, the portion
of the criminal opinion to which the Beam opinion referred was the
non-constitutional portion of the decision."' Finally, the Ash court
determined that the concurrences of Justice Blackmun and Justice
Scalia in Beam appear to take issue with the fact that the opinion was
not grounded in the Constitution.'"
The Ash court continued its analysis by noting that even if Beam
were constitutionally based, § 27A would still be constitutional."" The
court determined that although Beam held that courts must retroac-
tively apply federal rules of law when those rules have been applied to
the parties in the case which announces that rule, Beam did not pro-
scribe Congress's ability to refuse to apply the new rule of law retroac-
tively.'" The court noted that because Congress is not bound by Article
III, in that it does not adjudicate "cases and controversies," Beam
grounds tor our decision today are narrow. They are confined entirely to an issue of choice of
law: when the Court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one case it must do so with respect
to all others . . .").
328 Anixter //, 977 E2d at 1547.
327 806 E Stipp. 1473,1477-78 (E.D. Cal. 1992). The court had also determined that § 27A
does not violate the Klein rule in that it neither dictates the outcome in particular cases nor does
it fail to change the underlying law. Id. at 1476,1477.
328 /d. at 1473.
329 M. at 1477-78.
330 M. at 1478.
331 Id.
332 Ash, 806 F. Supp. at 1478.
333 Id.
339 Id.
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cannot be read to limit congressional authority."' Accordingly, the Ash
court concluded that § 27A is constitutional, and noted that if the rule
were otherwise then Congress would be prohibited from changing the
law once the Supreme Court issued an opinion.'"
Thus, the majority of courts that have addressed this issue have
rejected the arguments that § 27A violates the separation of powers
doctrine.ss" First, the courts have determined that § 27A changes the
law by prescribing a new statute of limitations which the courts must
apply to those cases instituted prior to June 19, 1991." Moreover, these
courts have concluded that § 27A does not direct specific factual
findings on the merits in specific cases. 539 Some of these courts have
also determined that § 27A is like the land management statute upheld
in Robertson II, in that it neither directs specific factual findings nor
compels a rule of decision in actions brought under § 10(b). 540
Second, courts have rejected the contention that § 27A(b) is un-
constitutional based on the proposition that Congress may not alter
final judicial judgments."' According to these courts, Sioux Nation,
which upheld a Congressional statute waiving the government's res
judicata defense in a takings claim previously decided in the govern-
ment's favor, stands for the proposition that Congress may, in some
instances, offer relitigation of decided claims."' These courts have
concluded that § 27A is like the statute at issue in Sioux Nation in that
it merely reinstates cases dismissed on technical grounds, rather than
on the merits."'" Thus, these courts have concluded that § 27A(b) does
not violate the separation of powers doctrine." 4
Finally, in addressing the argument that § 27A violates the sepa-
335 Id.
336 Id.; see also Berning v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, No. 91-3318, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6074,
at *19-20 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 1993), The Berning court determined that even if Beam were a
constitutional decision, the case merely holds that a court, under Article III, must apply the law
as it finds it. Id. According to the Berning court, however, "Beam does not hold that Congress
lacks the power to change the law for pending cases or that courts are constitutionally compelled
to disregard such changes." Id. at *20.
"7 E.g., Anixter II, 977 F.2d 1533, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Dennler v.
Trippet, 61 U.S.L.W. 3714 (1993); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th
Cir. 1992); Ash, 806 F. Supp. at 1477-78; Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F.
Supp. 476, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
338 	Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1545; Axel Johnson, 790 F. Stipp. at 479.
33° E.g., Anixter II; 977 F.2d at 1545; Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573; Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp.
at 479.
34° E.g., Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1545; Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573.
341 Anixter 11, 977 F.2d at 1546; Axel Johnson, 790 F. Stipp. at 481.
342 Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1546; Axel Johnson, 790 F. Stipp. at 481.
345 Anixter 11, 977 F.2d at 1546; Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 481-82.
344 Anixter 11, 977 F.2d at 1546; Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 483.
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ration of powers doctrine because it directs lower courts to ignore the
constitutional mandate of Beam, courts have held that Beam was not a
constitutional decision."45
 Instead, these courts have pointed to the
narrow choice of law grounds on which the Court's plurality opinion
in Beam rested."'" Thus, these courts concluded that Congress may
direct the courts to apply Lampf to some litigants but not to others,
without violating the separation of powers doctrine." 7
III. CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
In Lampf, the Supreme Court focused its efforts on promoting
predictability and judicial economy. 348
 Instead, however, the case
sparked a controversy which has been nothing if not unpredictable and
wasteful of judicial resources. Since the statute was passed, § 10(b)
litigation for those cases filed before June 19, 1991, has focused on the
appropriate statute of limitations, rather than on the merits of the
plaintiff's case. A logical solution to this problem would be for Con-
gress to enact a law creating a new statute of limitations. Indeed, efforts
at this type of legislation have been made. 349
 Until this happens, how-
ever, § 27A is destined to fill the dockets of the federal courts for years
to come, notwithstanding the constitutional issue.'"
Absent statutory correction, the debate over § 27A's constitution-
ality will likely be settled either by a number of consistent rulings in
the circuits or by a Supreme Court determination."' If the statute is
held unconstitutional, the one-and-three year rule established by the
Lampf Court will remain the law of the land for all cases, regardless of
when they were filed. One commentator has suggested, however, that
an invalidation of § 27A by the courts will cause Congress to swiftly
enact a new statute of limitations which will likely be longer than the
one-and-three year period created by Lampf. 352 On the other hand, if
343 Anixier 11, 977 F.2d at 1547; Ash v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 806 F. Stipp, 1473, 1477
(E.D. Cal. 1992).
346 Anixter 11, 977 F.2d at 1547; Ash, 806 F. Supp. at 1477.
547
 See Anixter II, 977 F.2d at 1547; Ash, 806 E Supp. at 1478.
545 See Oberly & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 53.
349 1d. at 54. Section 3 of Senate Bill 3181, entitled the "Securities Private Enforcement Act
of 1992," provides for a two-and-live year statute governing all private actions brought under
10(h) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. A separate bill introduced in the House of
Representatives, entitled "Securities Private Enforcement Reform Act," provides for a one-and-five
year limitary period. Id. Both bills were introduced in mid-August, 1992. Id.
335 BLOOMENTIIAL, Stlpra note 9, § 1.06, at 1-41.
531 See Oberly & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 53. A petition for certiorari was sought and denied
in the Anixter II case. 61 U.S.L.W. 3714 (1993).
532 See Obeli),
 & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 53.
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the statute is upheld, then § 10(b) cases will continue to operate under
a number of different statutes of limitations, dependent on both the
date on which and the jurisdiction where the case was filed. Moreover,
the courts will be forced to continue reinstating final judgments at
Congress's mandate. This Note argues that this practice of reinstating
cases dismissed in final judgments of the courts violates the separation
of powers doctrine.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has focused on the encroach-
ment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another in
determining whether the doctrine of separation of powers has been
violated."' Because the functions of the separate branches are not
viewed as hermetically sealed from one another, the Supreme Court
has upheld executive and legislative action in instances where there
has been some overlap among the branches.n 4
 Thus, the proper ques-
tion to be asked in determining whether § 27A violates the separation
of powers doctrine is not simply whether the legislative branch has
assumed functions of the judiciary, but whether that intrusion is sig-
nificant enough to rise to the level of "encroachment" and "aggran-
dizement."'" Against this standard, this Note considers the three argu-
ments that § 27A violates the separation of powers doctrine and
concludes that although the statute does not direct the outcome of
specific cases and does not require courts to ignore a constitutional
decision of the Supreme Court, § 27A unconstitutionally directs courts
to reinstate final judgment, in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.
Section 27A does not implicate a change in the statute of limita-
tions for private actions brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act. Rather, the statute tells courts not to apply the one-and-
three year limitary period promulgated by the Lampf Court.
Nevertheless, § 27A does not violate the separation of powers principle
because it does not direct a court's outcome in § 10 (b) litigation. Thus,
there is no evidence of aggrandizement or encroachment by the leg-
islature on the realm of the judiciary. Any challenge made to the
statute on the grounds that it directs specific decisions in specific cases
without changing the underlying law should therefore fail.
The circumstances surrounding the enactment of § 27A support
3" Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989).
351 Id. at 381.
355 See id. at 382.
"'See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress's efforts to
enact a new statute of limitations in response to the Lampf decision.
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the view that the statute failed to change the law. Congress attempted
to pass a measure that would enact a new statute of limitations. The
measure failed to garner enough support. 356 Unable to change the
limitary period Congress did the next best thing—it instructed the
lower courts to ignore the Lampf decision's retroactive application to
a set number of cases.'"
In order for § 27A's failure to change the law to rise to the level
of a separation of powers violation, Congress must direct the courts to
reach specific decisions in those cases rescued from the retroactive
application of Lampf. Only then will Congress have violated the rule
set forth by the Court in United States v. Klein. 358 In Klein, the Court
stated that Congress may not prescribe a rule of decision to the courts
in specific cases. 35" The Supreme Court has subsequently given the case
a broad reading. 3') In Sioux Nation, for example, the Court distin-
guished the congressional statute waiving the res judicata effect of a
prior judgment from the Klein proviso by noting that the statute in
Sioux Nation did not affect the lower court's ability to determine the
claim on the merits.m The Supreme Court made it clear that a retro-
active statute that did not alter the law was not invalid because it did
not direct the actual decision of the courts. 3"2
Even though § 27A fails to adequately change the law, it still does
not violate the doctrine set forth in Klein. Rather, the statute simply
removes a technical defense from cases. Section 27A does not direct
the courts to decide the outcome of specific cases in specific ways and
is not, therefore, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 363
A second challenge to § 27A on separation of powers grounds,
357 'Fhe argument that § 27A fails to change the law withstands any comparison to the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Robertson II. 'Fhe statute upheld in Robertson II had a
prospective effect, dictating a set of rules to apply to future limber harvesting. In this respect,
the statute clearly changed the law applying to fiiture litigation. Section 27A, on the other hand,
is entirely retroactive. The statute has no effect on any litigation other than the limited number
of § 10(b) cases pending in the federal courts when Lampfwas decided.
958
 so U.S. (13 Wall,) 128, 146 (1871).
559 Id.
56GUitited States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 1171, 405 (1980).
961 1d,
3b2 See id.
1161 Although the Bank of Denver court asserted that the statute in Klein did not direct a
decision on the merits for return of property, this argument misunderstands the nature of the
issue in Klein. Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 F. Stipp. 1092, 1097 (D. Colo.
1992). In Klein, whether the presidential pardon was evidence of loyalty or not, was dispositive
to the question of whether plaintiff's property should be returned. In the case of § 27A, on the
other hand, whether the statute of limitations is extended or not has nothing to do with whether
§ 10(b) violation occurred.
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asserting that the statute orders the lower courts to ignore the consti-
tutional proscription against selective prospectivity announced by the
Supreme Court in Beam, is also without merit. Indeed, it is true that
the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution, and Con-
gress cannot order the courts to ignore a constitutional determination
by the Court. 364
 Nevertheless, this constitutional fact is irrelevant to any
analysis of § 27A, because the Court's decision in Beam simply was not
based on the Constitution.
Interpretation of the Beam decision is complicated by the fact that
it was delivered by a severely fragmented plurality. The opinion by
Justice Souter, announcing the judgment of the Court, and joined
solely by Justice Stevens, rested on the view that selective prospectivity
was impermissible based on principles of equity and stare decisis. 365
Justice White, concurring separately, joined in this narrow holding of
the Court.366
 Justice Souter's opinion appeared to reject the arguments
made by Justices Scalia and Blackmun, in separate concurrences, that
selective prospectivity is constitutionally impermissible. 367
 The opinions
offered by the various members of the Court vary in the breadth of
the proscription of selective prospectivity. In such a situation, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the opinion resting on the narrowest
grounds represents the "highest. common denominator" of majority
agreement and should, therefore, be regarded as authoritative.' 68
 In
other words, for the purposes of precedential value, Beam stands for
the proposition that principles of equity and stare decisis prevent the
Court from applying a new rule to the litigants in the case announcing
that rule but not to claims predating the decision.
Of course, part of the stare decisis supporting the Supreme
Court's decision in Beam was an earlier case where the Supreme Court
held that selective prospectivity in the criminal context was constitu-
tionally impermissible.s69
 The Beam Court determined that this pre-
viously articulated bar against selective prospectivity could not be con-
fined to the criminal context only. 37° In Brichard, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California determined that
the Beam plurality's heavy reliance on the Court's earlier constitutional
364 Mai-bury v, Madison, 5 U.S. (I Grand') 137, 177 (1803).
365 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, III S. Ct. 2439, 2446 (1991).
366 1d. at 2449 (White, J., concurring).
367 Id. at 2449 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 2450 (Scalia, J., concurring).
368 Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 Comm.
L. REV. 756, 760-61 (1980) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
3wOriffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
370 Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2446.
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decision was significant." 71 Nevertheless, the decision as written by
Justice Souter never so much as mentions either Article III or the
Constitution itself. Because a Supreme Court interpretation of the
Constitution is generally regarded as the final word, unalterable by
Congress, it would be inappropriate to bind Congress's hands without
a more explicit indication by the Court that it was indeed offering its
view on the meaning of the Constitution. Thus, the separation of
powers doctrine does not prevent Congress from ordering that Lampf
be applied to some litigants but not to others because the Beam Court
did not clearly enunciate that it was offering a constitutionally based
decision.
Even if the Beam decision is constitutional, § 27A still does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine. Justices Blackmun and
Scalia, in grounding their concurrences in the Constitution, argued
that Article HI prevents the federal courts from applying a newly
announced rule to some parties and not to others. 372 justice Blackmun
asserted that "we fulfill our judicial responsibility by requiring retroac-
tive application of each new rule we announce." 373 This assertion indi-
cates that nothing can prevent Congress, under its Article I powers
from passing a law, which restricts that application of the rule the
Supreme Court announced in Lampf Although the courts, which are
constitutionally limited to hearing "cases and controversies" may be
proscribed from treating similarly situated litigants dissimilarly, Con-
gress remains free to change the rule announced by the Supreme
Court, thereby affecting some litigants and not others."' Accordingly,
courts should reject the argument that § 27A is in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine because it violates the constitutional
mandate announced by the Beam Court.
Although § 27A(a) appears to withstand constitutional challenges,
Section 27A(b) significantly encroaches on the judiciary's exclusive
power to adjudicate cases by directing the courts to reinstate cases
which have previously been dismissed. Regardless of the fact that liti-
gants are not considered to hold vested rights in a statute of limitation,
litigants do hold an interest in final judgments."' Moreover, when the
771 In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
572 13eam, 111 S. Ct. at. 2449 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 2450-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
473 Id. at 2450 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
371 In Robertson II, the Supreme CA.mrt made clear that Congress may (tired legislation at a
few existing cases. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1414 (1992),
376 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1945) (litigants do not have vested
rights in statutes of limitation); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805,
810 (11th Cir. 1988) (legislature cannot alter the rights of parties once vested by a solemn
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legislature reviews and reinstates final judgments of the courts, it ag-
grandizes its power in the sense that it acts like a super-appellate court
and denotes final decisions of the judiciary branch to mere advisory
opinions. This congressional interference into the heart of the judici-
ary function is not mitigated by the fact that § 27A authorizes relitiga-
tion on technical grounds only. 376
In Sioux Nation, the Court determined that a statute that author-
ized the relitigation of the Sioux' claim without regard to the res
judicata effect of a prior Claims Court judgment did not violate the
separation of powers doctrine. 377 The Sioux Nation Court determined
that Congress, in its capacity as settlor of the nation's debts, had merely
waived its res judicata defense to the Sioux' claim." Subsequently, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
Axel Johnson, determined that Sioux Nation stands for the proposition
that Congress, in some instances, may offer relitigation of decided
claims. 379
 This assertion, however, ignores the fundamental feature of
both Sioux Nation and the line of precedent on which the Supreme
Court relied in its holding—in all instances, the United States Govern-
ment was a litigant waiving its right in a previous favorable judgment. 38°
The Sioux Nation Court said nothing about Congress's ability to in-
trude into the judiciary's realm by reviewing and discarding final
judgments in litigation between private citizens. Sioux Nation should
be limited to its facts and circumstances and should not be used to
support an argument that § 27A(b) is constitutional.
Sioux Nation also should not be read, as it was by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Anixter II, to support the
proposition that Congress is free to waive the procedural defenses of
private litigants. 38 ' Although it is true that limitary periods are generally
created by Congress and are extended to litigants as a privilege and
not a right, this does not mean that Congress has the power to reinstate
a claim which the judiciary has determined to be time-barred. Once a
judgment). In Beam, the Supreme Court also affirmed the value of final decisions for litigants.
Ill S. Ct. at 2446. The Court stated: "once suit is barred by . statutes of limitation or repose,
a new rule cannot reopen the door already closed" because retroactivity must be limited by the
need for finality. Id.
376 See supra notes 307-23 and accompanying text for rationale offered by the Anixter 11 and
Axel Johnson courts as to why § 27A's waiver of a technical defense does not violate the rights of
litigan Es.
377 448 U.S. 371, 407 (1980).
378 Id. at 405.
379 790 F. Supp. 476, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
380 See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 395-402 (1980).
381 977 F.2d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir. 1992).
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defendant has been informed by a court that a plaintiff's claim is stale,
and the time for appeal has passed, that defendant should be able to
retain his or her confidence in our system of separation of powers that
Congress may not review and discard that judgment.
Because a party should be able to rely on a final judgment of a
court, the justifications asserted by the AxelJohnson court in opposition
to the defendant's argument that § 27A violates the separation of
powers doctrine are without merit."2 First, the AxelJohnson court main-
tained that the short time span transpiring between the court's issu-
ance of the final judgments and Congress's enactment of § 27A indi-
cated that Congress had not seriously intruded into the realm of the
judiciary, particularly in light of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."3 Once a court has reached a final judgment and the
right to appeal has passed, however, the court should not be con-
fronted with the litigants' reappearance in the courtroom because
Congress thinks the court should try the matter again—whether the
litigants appear one month or one decade after final judgment. More-
over, the Axel Johnson court's reliance on Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b) to support its assertion was disingenuous. The rule provides
that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, within a
reasonable amount of time, for any reason justifying relief."RA Nowhere,
however, does Rule 60(b) provide that Congress may order the courts
to reinstate judgments which the legislature believes the court should
hear again.
Second, contrary to the AxelJohnson court's assertion, the fact that
the § 10(b) claims were dismissed on technical grounds does not
render their reinstatement by Congress any less egregious. Although
it is true that a dismissal on technical grounds simply removes the
unforeseen benefit awarded to defendants by the Lampf court, rather
than stripping defendants of a valid judgment on the merits, it is simply
not within Congress's power to make that distinction. If we allow
Congress to step into the judiciary's shoes, picking and choosing
among litigants for whom reinstatement is appropriate, then we are
essentially giving Congress the power to act as an Article III court,
rather than an Article I legislature.
Finally, contrary to the suggestion of the Axel Johnson court, this
violation of the separatiori of powers principle is not remedied by the
assertion that Lampf was an unfair and misguided opinion in terms of
"2 790 F. Supp. at 482-83.
3" Id. at 482.
"4 FED. R. Civ, P. GO()).
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its retroactive application. The Lampf Court's decision to retroactively
apply the one-and-three year statute of limitations was unprecedented
and extremely unfortunate for plaintiffs who had spent years litigating
their case on the merits only to be told that the matter was time-
barred.385 The Supreme Court should certainly be criticized for its
unwillingness to adhere to its traditional policy of due process and
fundamental fairness in announcing new statutes of limitations. 886 Nev-
ertheless, Congress had an appropriate remedy for undoing the Su-
preme Court's error: it could swiftly enact new legislation retroactively
imposing a longer statute of limitations—something which that body
tried and failed to do. Instead, the legislature waited over five months
as a number of cases were dismissed by lower court's adhering to
Lampf s mandate. Only then was legislation passed by which Congress
asserted the role of the judiciary in allowing for reinstatement of final
judgments.
Section 27A(b) violates the separation of powers principle because
it strips defendants of their vested right in a final judgment and
intrudes on the power of the judiciary to issue final opinions. Regard-
less of the fact that Congress, in good faith sought to remedy the unfair
situation created by the joint decisions of Lampf and Beam, Congress
overstepped the line that separates the legislature from the judiciary.
Efforts at justifying this violation away are simply unpersuasive. Because
the legislature cannot alter the final judgments of the courts, § 27A(b)
is unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Congress's enactment of § 27A has fueled a powerful separation
of powers debate, dividing circuits, districts and commentators
throughout the country. Although the doctrine of separation of powers
does not require that the branches be hermetically sealed from one
another, § 27A impermissibly encroaches on the power of the judiciary
by requiring courts to reinstate cases dismissed due to the retroactive
application of Lampf. Reinstatement strips defendants of the vested
385 One commentator argues that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court, if confronted with
the Lampf issue a second time, would hold that Lampfs limitary period must be retroactively
applied. See Sabino, supra note 13, at 61. According to Mr. Sabino, the weight of the Court's past
precedent indicates that the Lampf rule should not have been applied retroactively. Id. at 64.
Thus, argues Mr. Sabino, the Supreme Court would regard the § 27A issue as an opportunity to
resolve concerns over Lampf s retroactive application. Id.
"3 See Lamp'', Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & l'etigrow v. Gilbertson, 111  S. Ct. 2773, 2786 (O'Con-
nor, J., dissenting), reh g denied, 112 S. Ct. 27 (1992).
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right in that judgment. Moreover, reinstatement reduces judicial deci-
sions to mere advisory opinions, thus allowing Congress to act as a
super-appellate court. Courts must therefore reject § 27A(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as an effort by Congress to aggrandize
its power at the expense of the judiciary.
HEIDE J. GOLDSTEIN
